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Mr Steve Georganas MP
Mr Ian Goodenough MP
Senator Nita Green
Ms Celia Hammond MP
Senator the Hon Sarah Henderson
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Secretariat
Anita Coles, Committee Secretary
Charlotte Fletcher, Principal Research Officer
Rebecca Preston, Principal Research Officer
Ingrid Zappe, Legislative Research Officer

External legal adviser
Associate Professor Jacqueline Mowbray
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Committee information

Under the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (the Act), the committee is required to examine bills, Acts and legislative instruments for compatibility with human rights, and report its findings to both Houses of the Parliament. The committee may also inquire into and report on any human rights matters referred to it by the Attorney-General.

The committee assesses legislation against the human rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); as well as five other treaties relating to particular groups and subject matter.1 A description of the rights most commonly arising in legislation examined by the committee is available on the committee’s website.2

The establishment of the committee builds on Parliament’s established tradition of legislative scrutiny. The committee’s scrutiny of legislation is undertaken as an assessment against Australia’s international human rights obligations, to enhance understanding of and respect for human rights in Australia and ensure attention is given to human rights issues in legislative and policy development.

Some human rights obligations are absolute under international law. However, in relation to most human rights, prescribed limitations on the enjoyment of a right may be permissible under international law if certain requirements are met. Accordingly, a focus of the committee’s reports is to determine whether any limitation of a human right identified in proposed legislation is permissible. A measure that limits a right must be prescribed by law; be in pursuit of a legitimate objective; be rationally connected to its stated objective; and be a proportionate way to achieve that objective (the limitation criteria). These four criteria provide the analytical framework for the committee.

A statement of compatibility for a measure limiting a right must provide a detailed and evidence-based assessment of the measure against the limitation criteria.

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1 These are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Where legislation raises human rights concerns, the committee's usual approach is to seek a response from the legislation proponent, or draw the matter to the attention of the proponent and the Parliament on an advice-only basis.

More information on the committee's analytical framework and approach to human rights scrutiny of legislation is contained in *Guidance Note 1*, a copy of which is available on the committee's website.³

Chapter 1

New and continuing matters

1.1 In this chapter the committee has examined the following bills and legislative instruments for compatibility with human rights:

- bills introduced into the Parliament between 22 to 25 March 2021;
- legislative instruments registered on the Federal Register of Legislation between 3 to 21 March 2021.\(^2\)
- one legislative instrument\(^3\) previously commented on.

1.2 Bills and legislative instruments from this period that the committee has determined not to comment on are set out at the end of the chapter.

1.3 The committee comments on the following bills and legislative instruments, and in some instances, seeks a response or further information from the relevant minister.

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1 This section can be cited as Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, New and continuing matters, *Report 5 of 2021*; [2021] AUPJCHR 44.

2 The committee examines all legislative instruments registered in the relevant period, as listed on the Federal Register of Legislation. To identify all of the legislative instruments scrutinised by the committee during this period, select ‘legislative instruments’ as the relevant type of legislation, select the event as ‘assent/making’, and input the relevant registration date range in the Federal Register of Legislation’s advanced search function, available at: [https://www.legislation.gov.au/AdvancedSearch](https://www.legislation.gov.au/AdvancedSearch).

3 Social Security (Parenting payment participation requirements – class of persons) Instrument 2021 [F2021L00064].
Bills

Family Law Amendment (Federal Family Violence Orders) Bill 2021

| Purpose | This bill seeks to establish new federal family violence orders which, if breached, can be criminally enforced |
| Portfolio | Attorney-General |
| Introduced | House of Representatives, 24 March 2021 |
| Rights | Life; security of the person; equality and non-discrimination; rights of the child; freedom of movement; private life |

Federal family violence orders

1.4 This bill seeks to amend the Family Law Act 1975 (Family Law Act) to introduce federal family violence orders in relation to a child or to a party to a marriage. A listed court may make a federal family violence order on application by a party or of its own motion. The order may provide for the personal protection of a child or a person related to a child, such as their parent or a person who has parental responsibility for the child, or a party to a marriage. In order to make a federal family violence order, the court would need to be satisfied that:

- it is appropriate for the welfare of the child (in relation to a child) or appropriate in the circumstances (in relation to a party to a marriage);
- on the balance of probabilities, the protected person has been subjected or (in the case of a child) exposed to family violence or there are reasonable

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1 This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Family Law Amendment (Federal Family Violence Orders) Bill 2021, Report 5 of 2021; [2021] AUPJCHR 45.
2 Schedule 1, item 1.
3 Schedule 1, item 2: A listed court includes the Family Court, Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Family Court of Western Australia and the Magistrates Court of Western Australia constituted by a Family Law Magistrate of Western Australia.
4 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AC(2); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(2).
5 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AC(3); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(3).
grounds to suspect that the protected person is likely to be subjected or (in the case of a child) exposed to family violence,6 and

• there is no family violence order in force in relation to the parties.7

1.5 The court would also be required to take into account other matters in making an order, including as the primary consideration, the safety and welfare of the child or protected person, as well as any additional considerations the court considers relevant, such as the criminal history of the person against whom the order is directed.8

1.6 The court may make the order on the terms it considers appropriate for the welfare of the child or in the circumstances, including any of the terms set out in the bill and any term the court considers reasonably necessary to ensure the personal protection of the protected person. For example, the terms may prohibit the person against whom the order is directed from: subjecting the protected person to family violence; contacting the protected person; being within a specified distance of the protected person or within an area that the protected person is likely to be located.9

1.7 The bill would make it a criminal offence to breach a term of a federal family violence order, carrying a penalty of imprisonment for two years, 120 penalty units or both.10 The default defences prescribed in the Criminal Code would be available in relation to this offence, except for the defence relating to self-induced intoxication.11 The bill also provides that criminal responsibility would not be extended to a protected

6 Section 4AB of the *Family Law Act 1975* defines family violence as 'violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful'. Examples of family violence include assault, sexual assault, stalking and unreasonably denying the family member financial autonomy. A child is exposed to family violence if they see or hear family violence or otherwise experience the effects of family violence.

7 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AC(6); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(4). Subsections 68AC(7) and 113AC(5) provide that in satisfying itself that no family violence order is in force, the court must inspect any record, database or register that contains information about family violence orders; is maintained by a Commonwealth, state or territory department, agency or authority; and is or can reasonably be made available to the court.

8 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AC(9); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(7).

9 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AC(8); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(6).

10 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed section 68AG; item 36, proposed section 113AG.

11 Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsections 68AG(2)–(3); item 36, proposed subsections 113AG(2)–(3). See explanatory memorandum, p. 45.
person in relation to conduct engaged in by that person that results in a breach of the order.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Preliminary international human rights legal advice}

\textit{Multiple rights}

1.8 The statement of compatibility notes that the measure would enable federal and family law courts to provide additional protection for victims of family violence by enabling the courts to make an order for their personal protection.\textsuperscript{13} It states that the measure would offer stronger protection for victims of family violence and in turn, would address the impacts of gender-based violence on women.\textsuperscript{14} The second reading speech notes that the measure will particularly benefit victims who are already before a family law court, as the measure will reduce the need for vulnerable families to navigate multiple courts, thus saving time and money, and enabling victims and survivors to access protection when they require it most.\textsuperscript{15} To the extent that the measure protects individuals from family violence, particularly women from gender-based violence, it would promote a number of rights, including the rights to life, security of the person, equality and non-discrimination (noting that women disproportionately experience family violence) and the rights of the child.

1.9 The right to life\textsuperscript{16} imposes an obligation on the state to protect people from being killed by others or identified risks.\textsuperscript{17} The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee has stated the duty to protect life requires States parties to 'enact a protective legal framework that includes effective criminal prohibitions on all manifestations of violence or incitement to violence that are likely to result in the deprivation of life'.\textsuperscript{18} The duty to protect life also requires States parties to adopt special measures of protection towards vulnerable persons, including victims of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AG(4); item 36, proposed subsection 113AG(4). See explanatory memorandum, p. 45.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Statement of compatibility, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Statement of compatibility, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Second reading speech, pp. 4–5.
\item \textsuperscript{16} International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6(1) and Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 1.
\item \textsuperscript{17} United Nations Human Rights Committee, \textit{General Comment No. 36: article 6 (right to life)} (2019) [3]: the right should not be interpreted narrowly and it ‘concerns the entitlement of individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity’.
\item \textsuperscript{18} United Nations Human Rights Committee, \textit{General Comment No. 36: article 6 (right to life)} (2019) [20].
\end{itemize}
domestic and gender-based violence and children. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has noted that:

Women's right to a life free from gender-based violence is indivisible from and interdependent on other human rights, including the rights to life, health, liberty and security of the person, equality and equal protection within the family, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and freedom of expression, movement, participation, assembly and association.

1.10 The right to security of the person requires the State to take steps to protect people against interference with personal integrity by others. This includes protecting people who are subject to death threats, assassination attempts, harassment and intimidation (including providing protection for people from domestic violence).

1.11 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has stated that 'gender-based violence against women constitutes discrimination against women under article 1 and therefore engages all obligations under the Convention' on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Article 2 imposes an immediate obligation on States to 'pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women', including gender-based violence against women. Measures to tackle gender-based violence include 'having laws, institutions and a system in place to address such violence and ensuring that they function effectively in practice'. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has recommended that States implement 'appropriate and accessible protective mechanisms to prevent further or potential violence', including the 'issuance and monitoring of eviction, protection, restraining or

19 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: article 6 (right to life) (2019) [23].
20 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19 (2017) [15].
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 9(1).
22 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19 (2017) [21]. The Committee suggested at paragraph [2] that the 'prohibition of gender-based violence against women has evolved into a principle of customary international law'.
24 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19 (2017) [24].
emergency barring orders against alleged perpetrators, including adequate sanctions for non-compliance.\(^{25}\)

1.12 Regarding the rights of the child, children have special rights under human rights law taking into account their particular vulnerabilities.\(^{26}\) States have an obligation to protect children from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual exploitation and abuse.\(^{27}\)

1.13 In enabling the making of family violence orders, the measure promotes all of these human rights. However, in order to achieve its important objectives, it also necessarily engages and limits a number of other rights, insofar as the measure will have the effect of prohibiting and restricting certain behaviours, movements and communications of the person against whom the order is directed. The statement of compatibility does not relevantly recognise that any of these rights may be limited.

1.14 In particular, the measure would enable the court to include a broad range of terms in a federal family violence order, such as prohibiting a person from being within a specified distance of a specified place or area that the protected person is, or is likely to be, located, such as the protected person's place of residence, workplace, education or care facility, local shopping centre or gym.\(^ {28}\) A term may also require the person against whom the order is directed to leave a place or area if the protected person is at that same place or area, or the protected person requests that person to leave the place or area.\(^ {29}\) Such terms would limit a person's right to freedom of movement and right to a private life. The right to freedom of movement includes the right to move freely within a country for those who are lawfully within the country.\(^ {30}\) It also encompasses freedom from procedural impediments, such as unreasonable restrictions on accessing public places. The right to privacy prohibits arbitrary and

\(^ {25}\) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, *General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19* (2017) [31].

\(^ {26}\) Convention on the Rights of the Child. See also, UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No. 17: Article 24* (1989) [1].

\(^ {27}\) Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 19, 34, 35 and 36.

\(^ {28}\) Explanatory memorandum, p. 28.

\(^ {29}\) Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsection 68AC(8); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(6).

\(^ {30}\) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 12.
unlawful interferences with an individual's privacy, family, correspondence or home life.\textsuperscript{31}

1.15 In addition, the bill would confer a broad discretion on the court to include in the order any term that it considers reasonably necessary to ensure the personal protection of the protected person. As such, it is possible that the terms of an order may also engage and limit other rights. The statement of compatibility does not acknowledge that the measure may limit these rights and as such there is no compatibility assessment as to whether any limitation is permissible. Most human rights, including the rights to freedom of movement and respect for private life, may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

1.16 As to the objective being pursued by the measure, the statement of compatibility states that it seeks to better protect victims of family violence and address the impacts of gender-based violence on women.\textsuperscript{32} This is a legitimate objective for the purposes of international human rights and insofar as the measure would enable the federal and family courts to make federal family violence orders for the personal protection of victims of family violence, the measure appears to be rationally connected to this objective.

1.17 A key aspect of whether a limitation on a right can be justified is whether the limitation is proportionate to the objective being sought. In assessing the proportionality of this measure, it is necessary to consider the scope of the measure, the potential interference with rights, and the existence of safeguards. The explanatory memorandum states that proposed subsections 68AC(8) and 113AC(6), which set out a non-exhaustive list of the kind of terms the court could include in an order, are intended to remove any doubt as to the court’s authority to impose terms of the kind specified in the provisions and, without fettering the court’s discretion, to provide the court with some guidance about terms that may be suitable to include.\textsuperscript{33} Regarding the broad discretion conferred on the court to include any terms that it considers reasonably necessary to ensure the personal protection of the protected person, the explanatory memorandum notes that this provision is intentionally non-prescriptive and is intended to confirm that the court is able and encouraged to customise orders on a case by case basis to meet the unique needs of the individuals

\textsuperscript{31} International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 17; UN Human Rights Committee, \textit{General Comment No. 16: Article 17} (1988) [3]–[4]. The UN Human Rights Committee further explains that this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons.

\textsuperscript{32} Statement of compatibility, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{33} Explanatory memorandum, pp. 26, 88.
affected.\textsuperscript{34} The explanatory memorandum states that there is no limit on the number or combination of terms that a court can impose, provided the terms are internally consistent and consistent with other relevant orders, reasonably capable of being complied with together, and practically enforceable.\textsuperscript{35}

1.18 While proposed subsections 68AC(8) and 113AC(6) are drafted in broad terms, the bill appears to provide some legislative guidance as to how the courts should exercise their discretion. In particular, the bill provides that the terms should be appropriate for the welfare of the child or in the circumstances (for a party to a marriage), and reasonably necessary to ensure the personal protection of the protected person.\textsuperscript{36} The safety and welfare of the protected person must also be a primary consideration. In addition, the explanatory memorandum provides useful guidance as to the kinds of term that could be included and how each term could be applied in practice, with an emphasis on terms being consistent and practically enforceable.\textsuperscript{37} The broad scope of the measure would appear to ensure that the courts have sufficient flexibility to treat different cases differently, having regard to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. This flexibility may assist with the proportionality of the measure. However, the breadth of the measure may also mean that the potential interference with rights is substantial, for instance, if an individual’s movements, communication, and privacy were restricted. In this regard, in assessing proportionality it is important that the measure is accompanied by sufficient safeguards to ensure that any limitation on rights is proportionate.

1.19 Noting that the statement of compatibility did not acknowledge that the measure may limit the rights to freedom of movement and a private life, in order to assess the proportionality of this measure, further information is required as to the existence of any safeguards and how such safeguards would likely operate in practice.

Committee view

1.20 The committee notes that the bill seeks to introduce federal family violence orders in relation to a child or a party to a marriage, which, if breached, can be criminally enforced. The court may make a federal family violence order on the terms it considers appropriate for the welfare of the child or in the circumstances, including any term the court considers reasonably necessary to ensure the personal protection of the protected person.

1.21 The committee considers that to the extent that the measure protects individuals from family violence, particularly women from gender-based violence, it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Explanatory memorandum, pp. 29, 91–92.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Explanatory memorandum, pp. 29, 92.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Schedule 1, item 13, proposed subsections 68AC(6) and 68AC(8)(h); item 36, proposed subsection 113AC(4).
\item \textsuperscript{37} Explanatory memorandum, pp. 25–29; 88–92.
\end{itemize}
would promote a number of rights, including the right to life, security of the person, right to equality and non-discrimination (noting that women disproportionately experience family violence) and the rights of the child. By enabling the court to make federal family violence orders for the personal protection of victims of family and gender-based violence, the measure would help to realise Australia's international human rights obligations to protect life; eliminate discrimination against women; including gender-based violence against women; protect people against interference with personal integrity by others; and protect children from all forms of violence and abuse. In particular, the committee notes the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women's recommendation that States implement appropriate and accessible protective mechanisms to prevent further or potential violence, including protection orders against alleged perpetrators and adequate sanctions for non-compliance with such orders.

1.22 However, the committee also notes that in order to achieve its important objectives, the measure also necessarily engages and limits a number of other rights insofar as it will have the effect of prohibiting and restricting certain behaviours, movements and communications of the person against whom the order is directed. These rights can be subject to permissible limitations that are reasonable, necessary and proportionate. However, the statement of compatibility does not relevantly recognise that any rights are limited and so provides no assessment as to the compatibility of the bill with these rights.

1.23 The committee has not yet formed a concluded view in relation to this matter. It considers further information is required to assess the human rights implications of this measure, and as such seeks the minister's advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [1.19].

Relationship between federal family violence orders and state and territory family violence orders

1.24 The bill seeks to introduce provisions to deal with the concurrent operation of federal and state and territory laws, and the relationship between federal and state and territory family violence orders. The bill provides that the proposed provisions establishing federal family violence orders are not intended to exclude or limit the operation of state or territory laws which are capable of operating concurrently. However, a state or territory family violence order that is inconsistent with a federal family violence order would be invalid to the extent of that inconsistency. 38 With respect to a federal family violence order in relation to a child, the bill provides that where a state or territory court is exercising powers to suspend or revoke a federal

38 Schedule 1, item 24, proposed sections 68NA and 68ND; item 44, proposed sections 114AB and 114AE.
family violence order, specified provisions of the Family Law Act do not apply, including any provision that would otherwise make the best interests of the child the paramount consideration.\(^{39}\) With respect to a federal family violence order in relation to a party to a marriage, the bill would allow certain provisions to be specified in the regulations that would not apply to a state or territory court exercising its power to suspend or revoke a federal family violence order.\(^{40}\)

**Preliminary international human rights legal advice**

**Rights of the child**

1.25 This aspect of the bill may engage and limit the rights of the child insofar as it would have the effect of not requiring the best interests of the child to be a paramount consideration in all actions concerning children. Australia is required to ensure that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child are a primary consideration.\(^{41}\) This requires legislative, administrative and judicial bodies and institutions to systematically consider how children's rights and interests are or will be affected directly or indirectly by their decisions and actions.\(^{42}\) The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has explained that:

> the expression "primary consideration" means that the child's best interests may not be considered on the same level as all other considerations. This strong position is justified by the special situation of the child.\(^{43}\)

1.26 The right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration in all actions concerning them may be limited by proposed section 68NC, which provides that where a state or territory court exercises its powers to suspend or revoke a federal family violence order, any provision that would otherwise make the best interests of the child the paramount consideration would not apply.\(^{44}\) Noting the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child's advice that children's best interests must have 'high priority and not just [be] one of several considerations', proposed section 68NC may have the effect of downgrading the 'best interests of the child' from a paramount or primary consideration to a relevant consideration.\(^{45}\) In addition, in

\(^{39}\) Schedule 1, item 24, proposed section 68NC.

\(^{40}\) Schedule 1, item 44, proposed section 114AE.

\(^{41}\) Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 3(1).

\(^{42}\) UN Committee on the Rights of Children, *General Comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interest taken as primary consideration* (2013).

\(^{43}\) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration* (2013) [37]; see also IAM v Denmark, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Communication No.3/2016 (2018) [11.8].

\(^{44}\) Schedule 1, item 24, proposed section 68NC.

\(^{45}\) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration* (2013) [39].
circumstances where the terms of a state or territory family violence order are invalid to the extent of any inconsistency with a federal family violence order, it is unclear whether this could have the effect of weakening protection for victims of family violence, including children.

1.27 The rights of the child may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective. The explanatory memorandum explains that proposed section 68NC is intended to clarify that the best interests of the child is not the paramount consideration in decisions to revoke or suspend a federal family violence order, although it would remain a relevant matter that the court would need to consider. The objective being pursued by this measure is unclear, as the statement of compatibility and the explanatory memorandum do not identify that the measure may limit the rights of the child nor address why it is necessary to downgrade the 'best interests of the child' from a paramount consideration to a relevant consideration. While the broader objectives of the bill are legitimate objectives for the purposes of international human rights law, further information is required to assess whether there is a pressing and substantial concern which gives rise to the need for this specific measure, and whether the measure is rationally connected to that objective.

1.28 In relation to assessing proportionality, the explanatory memorandum notes that the best interests of the child would still be a relevant matter for the court to take into account when exercising its power to revoke or suspend a federal family violence order. However, it is unclear whether this level of consideration would be adequate to meet the 'strong legal obligation on States' to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. Further information is therefore required to assess whether the measure is a proportionate limit on the rights of the child.

1.29 In order to assess the compatibility of this measure, further information is required as to:

(a) what is the objective being pursued by proposed section 68NC and how is the measure rationally connected to this objective;

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46 Explanatory memorandum, p. 76.

47 Explanatory memorandum, p. 76; Schedule 1, item 24, proposed subsection 68NB(5), which would require the court to have regard to whether the federal family violence order is adequate or is appropriate for the welfare for the child and the purposes of Division 11, as set out in substituted subsection 68N(2)(e) and section 60B of the Family Law Act 1975, which includes ensuring the best interests of the child are met as one of the objectives.

48 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (2013) [36].
(b) the likely circumstances in which the best interests of the child would not be considered as a paramount or primary consideration;

(c) what safeguards exist, if any, to ensure that any limitation on the rights of the child is proportionate; and

(d) whether it is possible that the provisions which provide that terms of a state or territory family violence order are invalid to the extent of any inconsistency with a federal family violence order could have the effect of weakening protection for victims of family violence, including children.

Committee view

1.30 The committee notes that the bill seeks to introduce provisions that deal with the concurrent operation of federal and state and territory laws, and the relationship between federal and state and territory family violence orders. In particular, the bill provides that where a state or territory family violence order is inconsistent with a federal family violence order, it would be invalid to the extent of that inconsistency. The committee notes that the bill also provides that where a state or territory court is exercising powers to suspend or revoke a federal family violence order in relation to a child, any provision that would otherwise make the best interests of the child the paramount consideration would not apply.

1.31 The committee notes that this measure may limit the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration in all actions or decisions that concern them. This right may be subject to permissible limitations if it is shown to be reasonable, necessary and proportionate. The committee notes that the statement of compatibility does not identify that this measure may limit rights and as such, no compatibility assessment has been provided.

1.32 The committee has not yet formed a concluded view in relation to this matter. It considers further information is required to assess the human rights implications of this measure, and as such seeks the minister's advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [1.29].
Migration Amendment (Clarifying International Obligations for Removal) Bill 2021

Purpose

This bill seeks to amend the Migration Act 1958 to:

- modify the effect of section 197C to ensure it does not require or authorise the removal of an unlawful non-citizen who has been found to engage protection obligations through the protection visa process unless:
  - the decision finding that the non-citizen engages protection obligations has been set aside;
  - the minister is satisfied that the non-citizen no longer engages protection obligations; or
  - the non-citizen requests voluntary removal; and
- ensure that, in assessing a protection visa application, protection obligations are always assessed, including in circumstances where the applicant is ineligible for visa grant due to criminal conduct or risks to security.

Portfolio

Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

Introduced

House of Representatives, 25 March 2021

Rights

Non-refoulement; liberty; prohibition against torture and ill-treatment; rights of the child

Removal of unlawful non-citizens where protection obligations engaged

1.33 Section 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Migration Act) sets out the circumstances in which mandatory removal of an 'unlawful non-citizen' is authorised. An 'unlawful non-citizen' is a person who is a non-citizen in the migration zone and does not hold a lawful visa. Subsection 197C(1) provides that for the purposes of removal of an 'unlawful non-citizen' under section 198, 'it is irrelevant whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations in respect of that person'.

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1 This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Migration Amendment (Clarifying International Obligations for Removal) Bill 2021, Report 5 of 2021; [2021] AUPJCHR 46.

2 Migration Act 1958, section 198.

3 Migration Act 1958, sections 13–14. Migration zone is defined in section 5.

4 Migration Act 1958, subsection 197(1).
refoulement obligations are international law obligations that require Australia not to return any person to a country where there is a real risk that they would face persecution, torture or other serious forms of harm. Subsection 197C(2) specifies that an 'officer’s duty to remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen under section 198 arises irrespective of whether there has been an assessment, according to law, of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in respect of the non-citizen'.

1.34 This bill proposes to add subsection 197C(3), which would provide that 'despite subsections (1) and (2), section 198 does not require or authorise an officer to remove an unlawful non-citizen to a country if': that person's valid application for a protection visa has been finally determined; a protection finding has been made in relation to that person; that protection finding has not been quashed, set aside or found by the minister to be no longer applicable; and the person has not asked the minister to be removed from the country. Proposed subsections 197C(4)–(7) would clarify the meaning of a protection finding for the purposes of proposed subsection 197C(3). In addition, the bill proposes that a reference in 197C of the Migration Act to a protection finding within the meaning of proposed subsections 197C(5) or (6) would include a reference to a protection finding made before the Schedule commences.

1.35 Proposed section 36A of this bill would also require the minister, in considering an application for a protection visa, to consider and make a record of whether they are satisfied that the applicant meets certain specified criterion for a protection visa under section 36 of the Migration Act. The minister would be required to consider and make a record of their finding before deciding whether to grant or refuse to grant a visa or considering whether the person satisfies other criteria for the grant of a visa. Read in conjunction with the proposed amendments to 197C, proposed section 36A would have the effect of ensuring that a protection finding is made within the meaning of proposed subsections 197(4) or (5) before the minister considers whether the person meets other criteria for the grant of a protection visa.

5 Migration Act 1958, subsection 197(2).
6 Schedule 1, item 3, proposed subsection 197C(3).
7 Schedule 1, item 3, proposed subsections 197C(4)–(7).
8 Schedule 1, subitem 4(3).
9 Schedule 1, item 1, proposed subsection 36A(1).
10 Schedule 1, item 1, proposed subsection 36A(2).
11 Explanatory memorandum, pp. 5–6.
Preliminary international human rights legal advice

Rights to non-refoulement; liberty; rights of the child; prohibition against torture and ill-treatment

Non-refoulement obligations

1.36 The bill engages, and may support Australia to uphold, its non-refoulement obligations insofar as it seeks to amend section 197C of the Migration Act to clarify that the removal power under section 198 does not require or authorise the removal of a person who is deemed an unlawful non-citizen and for whom a protection finding has been made through the protection visa process. Australia has non-refoulement obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This means that Australia must not return any person to a country where there is a real risk that they would face persecution, torture or other serious forms of harm, such as the death penalty; arbitrary deprivation of life; or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Non-refoulement obligations are absolute and may not be subject to any limitations. The committee has previously raised concerns with respect to the implications of section 197C of the Migration Act for Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee has also raised particular concerns about section 197C, recommending that Australia:

- ensure that the non-refoulement principle is secured in law and strictly adhered to in practice, and that all asylum seekers, regardless of their mode of arrival, have access to fair and efficient refugee status determination

12 Australia also has protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (and the 1967 Protocol), however, this is not one of the seven listed treaties under the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.

13 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No.4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22 (2018). See also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: article 7 (prohibition against torture) (1992) [9].

14 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No.4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22 (2018) [9].


procedures and non-refoulement determinations, including by...repealing section [197C of the Migration Act] and introducing a legal obligation to ensure that the removal of an individual must always be consistent with the State party’s non-refoulement obligations.17

1.37 The statement of compatibility states that the measure would ensure that the removal powers do not require or authorise the removal of an unlawful non-citizen whose valid application for a protection visa has been finally determined, and for whom a protection finding has been made through the protection visa process, in circumstances where to do so would be inconsistent with Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.18 In this way, the measure would ensure that a person cannot be removed to the country in relation to which their protection claims have been accepted, unless the non-refoulement obligations no longer apply or the person requests in writing to be removed.19 The statement of compatibility states that by ensuring that protection obligations are always assessed, even in circumstances where the applicant is ineligible for a visa because of criminal conduct or security risks, the measure enhances Australia’s ability to uphold its non-refoulement obligations.20 The measure appears to support Australia’s ability to adhere to its non-refoulement obligations to the extent that it would provide a statutory protection to ensure that an unlawful non-citizen to whom Australia owes protection obligations will not be removed from Australia, even where they are ineligible for the grant of a protection visa.21

Right to liberty and rights of the child

1.38 However, to the extent that the measure may also result in prolonged or indefinite immigration detention of persons who cannot be removed under

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17 UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Australia*, CCPR/C/AUS/6 (2017) [33]–[34].

18 Statement of compatibility, p. 12.

19 Statement of compatibility, p. 12.


21 Although, it is unclear whether ministerial Direction No. 90, which comes into effect on 15 April 2021, will have an adverse impact on this measure in practice, for example, by weakening the statutory protection of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. With respect to Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations, the Direction provides that: ‘[i]n making a decision under section 501 or 501CA, decision-makers should carefully weigh any non-refoulement obligation against the seriousness of the non-citizen’s criminal offending or other serious conduct. In doing so, decision-makers should be mindful that unlawful non-citizens are, in accordance with section 198, liable to removal from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable, and in the meantime, detention under section 189, noting also that section 197C of the Act provides that for the purposes of section 198, it is irrelevant whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations in respect of an unlawful non-citizen’: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, *Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and renovation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA* (15 April 2021) [9.1(2)].
section 198 because Australia's non-refoulement obligations are enlivened, the measure may also engage and limit the right to liberty. The right to liberty prohibits the arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty.\(^\text{22}\) The notion of 'arbitrariness' includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.\(^\text{23}\) Accordingly, any detention must not only be lawful, but also reasonable, necessary and proportionate in all of the circumstances as well as subject to periodic judicial review.\(^\text{24}\) In the context of mandatory immigration detention, detention may become arbitrary where individual circumstances are not taken into account; other, less intrusive measures could have achieved the same objective; a person may be subject to a significant length of detention; and a person is deprived of legal safeguards allowing them to challenge their indefinite detention.\(^\text{25}\)

1.39 Under the Migration Act, the consequence of a visa refusal or cancellation is mandatory immigration detention. This consequence is of particular concern in relation to individuals who have been found to engage Australia's non-refoulement obligations because, as clarified by the proposed amendments to section 197C in this bill, such individuals cannot be removed from Australia to the country in respect of which there has been a protection finding.\(^\text{26}\) This may give rise to the prospect of prolonged or indefinite immigration detention.\(^\text{27}\) The UN Human Rights Committee has made clear that 'the inability of a state to carry out the expulsion of an individual

\(^{22}\) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 9.


\(^{24}\) UN Human Rights Committee, \textit{Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Australia}, CCPR/C/AUS/6 (2017) [38].


\(^{26}\) \textit{Migration Act 1958}, sections 189, 196 and 198. Section 196 provides that an unlawful non-citizen detained under section 189 can be kept in immigration detention until (a) they are removed from Australia under sections 198 or 199; (aa) an officer begins to deal with them under subsection 198AD(3); (b) they are deported under section 200; or (c) they are granted a visa.

\(^{27}\) See the discussion below at paragraphs [1.53]–[1.54].
because of statelessness or other obstacles does not justify indefinite detention'. 28 In relation to the mandatory detention scheme under the Migration Act, the UN Human Rights Committee has observed that the scheme:

> does not meet the legal standards under article 9 of the Covenant [with respect to the right to liberty] due to the lengthy periods of migrant detention it allows and the indefinite detention of refugees and asylum seekers who have received adverse security assessments from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, without adequate procedural safeguards to meaningfully challenge their detention. 29

1.40 The statement of compatibility acknowledges that the right to liberty is engaged by the bill. 30 It states that the amendments are aimed at protecting from removal persons who engage Australia’s non-refoulement obligations but are ineligible for a grant of a protection visa because of character or security grounds. The statement of compatibility states that this means that persons affected by this bill 'may be subject to ongoing immigration detention under section 189 of the Migration Act'. 31 It notes that such persons may be detained until their removal is reasonably practicable, for example, if the circumstances in the relevant country improve such that Australia’s protection obligations are no longer engaged or a safe third country is willing to accept the person. 32 Therefore, to the extent that the measure would subject persons to whom protection obligations are owed but who are ineligible for a protection visa to ongoing mandatory immigration detention, without any time limit on the overall duration of detention, the measure limits the right to liberty.

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29 UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Australia*, CCPR/C/AUS/6 (2017) [37]. The Committee also raised concerns about ‘poor conditions of detention in some facilities, the detention of asylum seekers together with migrants who have been refused a visa due to their criminal records, the high reported rates of mental health problems among migrants in detention, which allegedly correlate to the length and conditions of detention, and the reported increased use of force and physical restraint against migrants in detention (arts. 2, 7, 9, 10, 13 and 24)’.


31 Statement of compatibility, p. 13.

Furthermore, where the measure applies to children, it may also engage and limit the rights of the child. Children have special rights under international human rights law taking into account their particular vulnerabilities. In the context of immigration detention, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that:

children should not be deprived of liberty, except as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time, taking into account their best interests as a primary consideration with regard to the duration and conditions of detention, and also taking into account the extreme vulnerability and need for care of unaccompanied minors.

The right to liberty and the rights of the child may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

Legitimate objective and rational connection

The statement of compatibility states that the purpose of the bill is to clarify that the duty to remove under section 198 of the Migration Act should not be enlivened where to do so would be in breach of Australia’s protection obligations, as identified in a protection visa assessment process. The statement of compatibility notes that the amendments are necessary because of the interpretation of section

33 Including the requirement that the best interests of the child be the primary consideration in all actions concerning children; the obligation to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to child refugees and asylum seekers; the requirement that detention is used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; and the obligation to take measures to promote the health, self-respect and dignity of children recovering from torture and trauma: Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 3(1), 22, 37(b) and 39.

34 Convention on the Rights of the Child. See also, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 17: Article 24 (1989) [1].

35 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of person (2014) [18].

36 Statement of compatibility, p. 11.
197C in the Federal Court decisions of *DMH16*\(^{37}\) and *AJL20*,\(^{38}\) in which section 197C was interpreted as obliging the minister to send an unlawful non-citizen back to a country despite any protection obligations owed (and where removal is not carried out as soon as reasonably practicable, the person may be found to be unlawfully detained and must be released from immigration detention). The objective of upholding Australia’s non-refoulement obligations is a legitimate objective for the purposes of international human rights law. To the extent that the proposed amendments to section 197C prevent persons to whom protection obligations are owed from being removed to the country in respect of which there has been a protection finding, the measure appears to be rationally connected to the objective of upholding Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.

**Proportionality**

1.44 The key question is whether the proposed limitation on rights is proportionate to the objective being sought. In assessing the proportionality of this measure, it is necessary to consider whether the proposed limitation: is accompanied by sufficient safeguards; whether any less rights restrictive alternatives could achieve the same stated objective; and whether there is sufficient flexibility to treat different cases differently. The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that decisions to subject asylum seekers to protracted detention ‘must consider relevant factors case by case and not be based on a mandatory rule for a broad category; must take into account less invasive means of achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions to prevent absconding; and must be subject to periodic re-evaluation and judicial review’.\(^{39}\)

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37 *DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* (2017) 253 FCR 576. In this case, the Court ordered that the decision of the Minister to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant be quashed and returned to the minister for reconsideration. At [30], the court held that: ‘Had the Minister properly understood the consequence of the refusal of the protection visa at the time he made the decision there is a possibility that he would have granted the protection visa in order to avoid the consequence that the applicant would be returned to Syria in contravention of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in respect of the applicant’.

38 *AJL20 v Commonwealth of Australia* [2020] FCA 1305. In this case, the court found the applicant’s detention by the Commonwealth to be unlawful and ordered the applicant’s release from detention. The detention was found to be unlawful because: ‘the removal of the applicant from Australia has not been shown to have been undertaken or carried into effect as soon as reasonably practicable, that there was therefore a departure from the requisite removal purpose for the applicant’s detention over the course of that period and that, as a consequence, the applicant’s detention by the Commonwealth was unlawful throughout that period’ (at [128] and [171]).

1.45 With respect to the limit on the right to liberty, the statement of compatibility notes that immigration detention is a key component of border management and assists to manage potential threats to the Australian community as well as ensure that people are available for removal.\(^{40}\) It explains that detention is a last resort measure for managing unlawful non-citizens, particularly those whose removal may not be practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future.\(^{41}\) The statement of compatibility notes that the government’s preference is to manage such persons in the community if possible, subject to meeting relevant requirements such as not presenting an unacceptable risk to the safety and good order of the community.\(^{42}\) In addition, the statement of compatibility notes that the minister has a personal discretionary power to intervene in an individual case and grant a visa to a person in immigration detention where they think it is in the public interest to do so.\(^{43}\) The statement of compatibility states that it is within the discretion of the minister to decide what is and what is not in the public interest.\(^{44}\) The minister also has a discretionary power to make a residence determination allowing a detainee to reside outside of immigration detention at a specified address in the community, subject to conditions.\(^{45}\) The statement of compatibility notes that these discretionary powers would enable the minister to take into account individual circumstances and implement the least restrictive option, thus helping to ensure that immigration detention is reasonable, necessary, proportionate and not arbitrary.\(^{46}\) The statement of compatibility does not identify any other safeguards beyond the minister’s discretionary powers.

1.46 While the minister’s discretionary powers may provide some flexibility to treat individual cases differently, it is not apparent that they would necessarily serve as an effective safeguard in practice. This is because the minister is not under a duty to consider whether to exercise these discretionary powers; the threshold for exercising the discretionary powers is a broad public interest test; the powers are non-reviewable and non-compellable; and the powers do not attract the requirements of procedural fairness.\(^{47}\) It is also unclear how often these powers are exercised in practice. Additionally, while the statement of compatibility indicates that it is the government’s preference to manage non-citizens in the community wherever possible and use

\(^{40}\) Statement of compatibility, p. 13.

\(^{41}\) Statement of compatibility, p. 13.

\(^{42}\) Statement of compatibility, p. 13–14.


\(^{44}\) Statement of compatibility, p. 14.

\(^{45}\) Migration Act 1958, section 197AB; statement of compatibility, p. 14.

\(^{46}\) Statement of compatibility, p. 14.

detention as a last resort, there is no legislative requirement to do so. Rather, detention is the default option for managing unlawful non-citizens under the Migration Act rather than a last resort. The discretionary powers provide only a very limited exception to the rule of mandatory detention. It is also unclear the extent to which the individual circumstances of detainees, including the effect of detention on their physical or mental health, would be considered in the minister's decision as to whether exercising the discretion is in the public interest. The UN Human Rights Committee has indicated that detention may be arbitrary where there is a failure to take into account relevant individual circumstances in decisions about detention, including the effect of detention on a detainee's health, and there is an absence of particular reasons specific to the individual to justify detention. For these reasons, it does not appear that the minister's discretionary powers alone would be a sufficient safeguard for the purpose of a permissible limitation under international human rights law.

1.47 A related consideration in assessing proportionality is whether there are less rights restrictive measures, that is, alternatives to detention, that could be applied to individuals affected by the measure. In its Detention Guidelines, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has made clear that:

consideration of alternatives to detention – from reporting requirements to structured community supervision and/or case management programmes...is part of an overall assessment of the necessity, reasonableness and proportionality of detention. Such consideration ensures that detention of asylum-seekers is a measure of last, rather than first, resort. It must be shown that in light of the asylum-seeker’s particular circumstances, there were not less invasive or coercive means of achieving the same ends.

1.48 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees further stated that alternatives to detention must be accessible in practice (not merely available on paper) and should not be used as alternative forms of detention. The minister's discretionary powers

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49 Section 189 requires the mandatory detention of unlawful non-citizens without regard to individual circumstances: Migration Act 1958, subsection 189(1). The duration of detention is set out in section 196.

50 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of person (2014) [18].

51 See UNHCR, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012) [34].

52 UNHCR, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012) [35].

do not appear to offer an accessible alternative to detention because there is no legislative requirement to assess, on a case by case basis, alternatives to detention; the Migration Act provides minimal flexibility to apply less restrictive measures in individual cases, noting that detention remains a first, rather than last, resort; and a residence determination is an alternative form of detention.

1.49 Another relevant factor in assessing proportionality is whether there is the possibility of oversight and the availability of review. Under international human rights law, a person who is detained, for any reason, has the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in court without delay. The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasised that periodic re-evaluation and judicial review of immigration detention must be available to scrutinise whether the continued detention is lawful and non-arbitrary. Judicial review in this context must also be effective so as to enable a detainee to challenge their detention in substantive terms. In considering the availability of judicial review under the Migration Act and detainees' ability to challenge the legality of their detention, the UN Human Rights Committee has observed:

In view of the High Court’s 2004 precedent in Al-Kateb v Godwin declaring the lawfulness of indefinite immigration detention and the absence of relevant precedents in the State party's response showing the effectiveness of an application before the High Court in similar situations, the Committee is not convinced that it is open to the Court to review the justification of the author’s detention in substantive terms. Furthermore, the Committee notes that in the High Court’s decision in the M47 case, the Court upheld the continuing mandatory detention of the refugee, demonstrating that a successful legal challenge need not lead to release from arbitrary detention. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that judicial review of the lawfulness of detention under article 9, paragraph 4, is not limited to mere compliance of the detention with domestic law but must include the possibility to order release if the detention is incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant.

1.50 In the more recent case of AJL20, which the statement of compatibility states this bill is in response to, an individual from Syria, who is owed protection obligations but has been refused a protection visa on character grounds, was successfully able to

54 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of person (2014) [18].
57 Statement of compatibility, p. 11.
challenge the legality of his detention, with the Federal Court ordering his release forthwith.\textsuperscript{58} The Court held that detention was unlawful because:

the removal of the applicant from Australia has not been shown to have been undertaken or carried into effect as soon as reasonably practicable [as obliged by section 198 of the Migration Act], that there was therefore a departure from the requisite removal purpose for the applicant's detention over the course of [the relevant periods] and that, as a consequence, the applicant's detention by the Commonwealth was unlawful throughout [those periods].\textsuperscript{59}

1.51 However, this case has been appealed by the Commonwealth and the High Court of Australia has reserved its decision in this matter.\textsuperscript{60}

1.52 In addition, this bill seeks to remove the basis on which the applicant was released in \textit{AJL20} by clarifying that there is no requirement to remove an unlawful non-citizen from Australia to a country in respect of which there has been a protection finding in a protection visa process in relation to that person.\textsuperscript{61} It appears that the effect of this bill would be to make it more difficult to mount a successful legal challenge to indefinite immigration detention for persons in similar circumstances to those of the individual in \textit{AJL20}. If the bill did have this effect, questions arise as to whether a court could substantively review the justification for detention of such individuals and whether review would include the possibility of ordering a person's release from detention. In order for review in the context of this measure to be effective for the purposes of international human rights law, it must be 'in its effects, real and not merely formal' and the court must be empowered to order release.\textsuperscript{62}

More broadly, it is noted that the committee has previously concluded that judicial review without merits review is unlikely to be sufficient to fulfil the international standard required of effective review. This is because judicial review is only available on a number of restricted grounds and does not allow the court to take a full review of the facts (that is, the merits), as well as the law and policy aspects of the original decision to determine whether the decision is the correct or preferable decision.\textsuperscript{63}

While access to judicial review is available with respect to the lawfulness of

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{AJL20 v Commonwealth of Australia} [2020] FCA 1305.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{AJL20 v Commonwealth of Australia} [2020] FCA 1305 [128] and [171].

\textsuperscript{60} See \textit{Commonwealth of Australia v AJL20} [2021] HCATrans 68 (13 April 2021).

\textsuperscript{61} Statement of compatibility, pp. 11–12.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{A v Australia}, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 560/1993 (1997) [9.5].

immigration detention, there are serious concerns that, in the absence of merits review, this is not effective in practice to allow release from detention in appropriate cases and so does not appear to assist with the proportionality of this measure.

1.53 A further consideration in assessing proportionality is the extent of any interference with human rights. The greater the interference, the less likely the measure is to be considered proportionate. The length and conditions of detention are relevant in this regard. As the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has observed:

The length of detention can render an otherwise lawful decision to detain disproportionate and, therefore, arbitrary. Indefinite detention for immigration purposes is arbitrary as a matter of international human rights law.64

1.54 This measure may result in a significant interference with human rights as there is a risk that where a person is owed protection obligations and therefore cannot be removed from Australia, but is ineligible for a grant of a visa, they may be subject to ongoing immigration detention while they await removal.65 The statement of compatibility notes that removal may occur where the circumstances in the relevant country improve such that the person no longer engages non-refoulement obligations or a safe third country is willing to accept the person.66 However, without any legislative maximum period of detention and an absence of effective safeguards to protect against arbitrary detention, there is a real risk that detention may become indefinite, particularly where the circumstances in the relevant country are unlikely to improve in the reasonably foreseeable future. Where the measure results in the indefinite detention of certain persons, it does not appear to be proportionate to the aims of the measure.

Prohibition against torture and ill-treatment

1.55 Finally, to the extent that the measure results in prolonged or indefinite detention, it may also have implications for Australia’s obligation not to subject any person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.67 This obligation is absolute and may never be limited. In cases considering individuals detained under Australia’s mandatory immigration detention scheme, the UN Human Rights Committee has found that the combination of subjecting individuals to arbitrary and protracted and/or indefinite detention, the absence of procedural safeguards to challenge that detention, and the difficult detention conditions, cumulatively inflicts serious psychological harm on such individuals that amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.68

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64 UNHCR, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012) [44].


67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 7; and Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, articles 3–5.
degrading treatment. If the measure has the effect of subjecting persons who are owed protection obligations but ineligible for a visa to ongoing immigration detention in similarly difficult conditions, there would appear to be a risk that the measure may have implications for Australia’s obligation not to subject any person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The statement of compatibility does not address the implications of the measure for the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment, and accordingly, no compatibility assessment is provided with respect to this right.

Concluding remarks

1.56 In conclusion, the measure pursues the legitimate objective of supporting Australia to uphold its non-refoulement obligations and the measure appears to be rationally connected to that objective insofar as it would ensure that persons to whom protection obligations are owed are not removed to the country in relation to which there has been a protection finding. However, there are serious concerns as to whether the measure is proportionate. While the minister’s discretionary powers may provide some flexibility to treat individual cases differently, it seems unlikely that these non-reviewable and non-compellable powers would operate as an effective safeguard in practice or offer an accessible alternative to detention. To the extent that the effect of the measure would be to make it more difficult to mount a successful legal challenge to detention for persons who are owed protection obligations but are ineligible for a grant of a visa, there are concerns that access to review in these circumstances would not be effective in practice, noting that review of detention should not be limited to compliance with law and must include the possibility of release. Finally, if the measure resulted in the indefinite detention of individuals, this would represent a significant interference with their rights. For these reasons, there appears to be a significant risk that the measure impermissibly limits the right to liberty and the rights of the child, and has implications for the prohibition against torture or ill-treatment.

1.57 In order to fully assess the compatibility of this measure with human rights, further information is required, in particular:

(a) with respect to people to whom protection obligations are owed but who were ineligible for a grant of a visa on character or other grounds, in the last five years:

(i) how many people were, or are currently, detained in immigration detention, and for how long were they, or have they been, detained; and

(ii) of this number, how many were:

- granted a visa by the minister in the exercise of the minister's personal discretionary powers under section 195A (discretion to grant a detainee a visa) or were released into community detention under section 197AB (residence determination); and
- returned to the country in relation to which there had been a protection finding because conditions in that country had improved such that protection obligations were no longer owing or sent to a safe third country;

(b) what effective safeguards exist to ensure that the limits on the right to liberty and the rights of the child are proportionate;

(c) what effective safeguards exist to ensure that persons affected by this measure in immigration detention will not be indefinitely detained and consequently at risk of being subjected to ill-treatment, and how the measure is compatible with the prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and

(d) whether this measure will have any impact on persons involved in current litigation or who have been unlawfully detained based on the caselaw established by the Federal Court decision in AJL20.

Committee view

1.58 The committee notes that the bill proposes to amend the Migration Act to clarify that the power to remove an unlawful non-citizen does not require or authorise an officer to remove a person where there has been a protection finding in relation to that person. The bill also proposes to introduce provisions which would have the effect of ensuring that protection obligations are always assessed, including before the minister considers whether the person meets other criteria for the grant of a protection visa.

1.59 The committee considers that the measure would support Australia's ability to uphold its non-refoulement obligations. However, the committee notes that the statement of compatibility states that these amendments are in response to two Federal Court cases that found that the current provisions oblige the minister to send an unlawful non-citizen back to a country despite any protection obligations owed, and if the minister will not do so as soon as reasonably practicable the person must be released from immigration detention. As such, to the extent that the measure may result in prolonged or indefinite detention of persons who are deemed to be unlawful non-citizens and cannot be removed because a protection finding has been made in relation to them, the measure also engages and limits the right to liberty and the rights of the child. These rights may be subject to permissible limitations if they are shown to be reasonable, necessary and proportionate.
1.60 In addition, the committee notes that to the extent that the measure results in indefinite detention, it may also have implications for Australia’s obligation not to subject any person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This obligation is absolute and may never be limited.

1.61 The committee considers that the measure pursues the legitimate objective of supporting Australia to uphold its non-refoulement obligations and is rationally connected to that objective. However, the committee notes that there are serious concerns as to whether the measure is proportionate and therefore compatible with the right to liberty and the rights of the child. The committee also notes the statement of compatibility did not address whether the measure is compatible with the prohibition against torture or ill-treatment.

1.62 The committee has not yet formed a concluded view in relation to this matter. It considers further information is required to assess the human rights implications of this bill, and as such seeks the minister’s advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [1.57].
Legislative Instruments

Social Security (Assurances of Support Amendment Determination 2021 [F2021L00198]¹

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>This legislative instrument amends the Social Security Act 1991 to:</th>
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<td>• make 31 March 2024 the new repeal date of the Social Security (Assurances of Support) Determination 2018 (the Determination);</td>
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<td>• clarify the values of securities for bodies under section 20 of the Determination, where the assurance period is for four years; and</td>
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<td>• replace references to newstart allowance with jobseeker payment</td>
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Portfolio
Social Services

Authorising legislation
Social Security Act 1991

Last day to disallow
15 sitting days after tabling (tabled in the House of Representatives and the Senate on 15 March 2021). Notice of motion to disallow must be given by 1 June 2021 in the House of Representatives and 4 August in the Senate²

Rights
Protection of the family and rights of the child

Extending the assurances of support determination

1.63 This instrument extends by three years an existing determination which specifies requirements to be met for assurances of support. An assurance of support is an undertaking by a person (the assurer) that they will repay the Commonwealth the amount of any social security payments received during a certain period by a

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¹ This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Social Security (Assurances of Support Amendment Determination 2021 [F2021L00198], Report 5 of 2021; [2021] AUPJCHR 47.

² In the event of any change to the Senate or House’s sitting days, the last day for the notice would change accordingly.
migrant seeking to enter Australia. This period could be up to ten years. This would appear to include any class of visa, including child and parent visas. The Social Security (Assurances of Support) Determination 2018, which this instrument extends, specifies the social security payments subject to these assurances of support; the requirements that assurers must meet to give assurances of support; the period for which assurances of support remain valid; and the value of securities to be given. In particular, it specifies that the period the assurances of support remain valid range from 12 months to 10 years, with most valid for 4 years. In addition, it specifies that the value of securities to be provided by an individual (i.e. payment of an upfront bond) for a parent visa is up to $10,000, and for all other types is up to $5,000.

Preliminary international human rights legal advice

Rights to protection of the family and the child

1.64 A measure which limits the ability of certain family members to join others in a country is a limitation on the right to protection of the family. Insofar as the visa classes affected by the requirement for an assurance of support include child visas and adoption visas, the measure also engages the rights of children.

1.65 An important element of protection of the family is to ensure family members are not involuntarily separated from one another. Laws and measures which prevent family members from being together will engage this right. Additionally, Australia is required to ensure that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the

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3 Section 1061ZGA(a) of the Social Security Act 1991. Recoverable social security payments for the purpose of assurances of support include widow allowance, parenting payment, youth allowance, Austudy payment, jobseeker allowance, mature age allowance, sickness allowance, special benefit and partner allowance.

4 Recoverable social security payments for the purpose of assurances of support include widow allowance, parenting payment, youth allowance, Austudy payment, jobseeker payment, mature age allowance, sickness allowance, special benefit and partner allowance. Social Security (Assurances of Support) Determination 2018, section 6.

5 For an assurance of support for aged parent visas, the period is 10 years; for an assurance of support for a Community Support Programme entrant, the period is 12 months; for an assurance of support for remaining relative, and orphan relative visas, the period is 2 years; and in any other case the period is 4 years. Social Security (Assurances of Support) Determination 2018, section 24.


7 See, for example, Sen v the Netherlands, European Court of Human Rights Application no. 31465/96 (2001); Tuquabo-Tekle And Others v The Netherlands, European Court of Human Rights Application no. 60665/00 (2006) [41]; Maslov v Austria, European Court of Human Rights Application no. 1638/03 (2008) [61]-[67].

8 Protected by articles 17 and 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
child are a primary consideration, and to treat applications by minors for family reunification in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.9

1.66 These rights may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

1.67 The statement of compatibility states that the primary objective of the assurance of support scheme is to ‘protect social security outlays while allowing the migration of people who might otherwise not normally be permitted to come to Australia’.10 These may be capable of constituting legitimate objectives under international human rights law and the measure appears to be rationally connected to that objective.11

1.68 In respect of proportionality it is necessary to consider if there is flexibility to treat different cases differently and safeguards to help to protect the right to protection of the family and the rights of the child. The statement of compatibility does not provide any detail in relation to this. It states that migrants will continue to be able to apply for a visa to come to, or remain in, Australia permanently (including to reunite with family) and have their visa application granted, 'subject to meeting the eligibility criteria including, where relevant, obtaining an assurance of support'. It states that to the extent that the assurance of support scheme limits the right to the protection of the family, and rights of parents and children, this is reasonable and proportionate to achieving the legitimate purpose of the scheme.12

1.69 However, the statement of compatibility does not explain how the measure is proportionate. In particular, it is not clear what visa types this measure applies to. When the committee has previously examined the assurance of support scheme and sought advice from the relevant minister, the minister had advised that an assurance of support may be mandatory or discretionary, depending on the visa type. Specifically it was advised that Visa Subclass 101 (Child) and Visa Subclass 102 (Adoption) have a discretionary assurance of support provision, and therefore an assurer may not have to provide a monetary bond unless the Department of Human Services requests an assurance where further evidence is required to establish that the assurer can provide an adequate standard of living for the visa applicant.13 However, this did not explain

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9 Article 3(1) and 10 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
10 Statement of compatibility, p. 6.
12 Statement of compatibility, p. 8.
whether there are other visa types that could apply when an assurer is seeking to sponsor a dependent relative, which may be subject to mandatory requirements for assurances of support, and therefore the requirement to pay an upfront monetary bond. It is also not clear how visa types are specified as being subject to the mandatory or discretionary assurances of support, and whether the rights to protection of the family and the rights of the child are considered when requiring a person to provide an upfront bond. It is therefore unclear, in practice, if there may be situations where an assurer subject to a monetary bond may be unable to provide such a bond and therefore unable to access family reunification, in circumstances that may not comply with their right to protection of the family.14

1.70 Further information is required to assess the compatibility of this measure with the right to protection of the family and the rights of the child, in particular:

(a) what visa categories are subject to the assurance of support scheme;
(b) what visa categories are subject to a mandatory assurance of support and what visa categories are subject to discretionary assurances of support (and how is this determined);
(c) what criteria does the Department of Home Affairs rely on to determine when it should use its discretionary powers to require an assurance of support (and where are these found);
(d) does the department consider the right to the protection of the family and the rights of the child when determining whether to require payment of an upfront bond, and what safeguards exist to ensure dependent family members are not involuntarily separated if family members cannot afford to provide an assurance of support.

Committee view

1.71 The committee notes this legislative instrument extends by three years an existing determination that specifies matters relating to the assurance of support scheme. An assurance of support is an undertaking by a person (the assurer) that they will repay the Commonwealth the amount of any social security payments received during a certain period by a migrant seeking to enter Australia.

1.72 The committee notes that requiring the payment of an upfront bond may limit the ability of certain family members, including potentially children, to join others in Australia. This would appear to limit the right to protection of the family, and insofar as the visa classes affected by the requirement for an assurance of support include child visas and adoption visas, also engages the rights of children. These rights may be permissibly limited where a limitation is shown to be reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

14 See articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR and article 10 of the ICESCR.
1.73 The committee has not yet formed a concluded view in relation to this matter. It considers further information is required to assess the human rights implications of this legislative instrument, and as such seeks the minister's advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [1.70].
Social Security (Parenting payment participation requirements – class of persons) Instrument 2021
[F2021L00064]¹

| Purpose | This legislative instrument specifies a class of persons, described as Compulsory Participants, for the purposes of paragraph 500(1)(ca) of the Social Security Act 1991, requiring them to participate in the ParentsNext program in order to be in continued receipt of the Parenting Payment |
| Portfolio | Education, Skills and Employment |
| Authorising legislation | Social Security Act 1991 |
| Last day to disallow | 15 sitting days after tabling (tabled in the Senate and the House of Representatives on 2 February 2021). Notice of motion to disallow must be given by 11 May 2021 in the Senate² |
| Rights | Social security; adequate standard of living; privacy; equality and non-discrimination; rights of the child; work; education |

1.74 The committee requested a response from the minister in relation to the bill in Report 2 of 2021.³

Suspension of parenting payment for mutual obligation failures

1.75 This legislative instrument provides that a specific class of persons receiving parenting payment may be required to participate in the ParentsNext pre-employment program in order to remain eligible for the payment.⁴

1.76 A person would fall within this class if, on or after 1 July 2021, they:

1 This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Social Security (Parenting payment participation requirements – class of persons) Instrument 2021 [F2021L00064], Report 5 of 2021; [2021] AUPJCHR 48.

2 In the event of any change to the Senate or House’s sitting days, the last day for the notice would change accordingly.


4 This legislative instrument is made pursuant to subsection 500(1)(ca) of the Social Security Act 1991.
(a) reside in a 'jobactive employment region';

(b) have been receiving parenting payment for a continuous period of at least six months prior to that day;

(c) have a young child who is between nine months and six years of age;

(d) have not engaged in work in the six month period immediately prior;

(e) are aged under 55 years; and

(f) are either

   (i) an 'early school leaver' (that is, aged under 22 years and have not completed the final year of school); or

   (ii) are aged at least 22 years and have not completed their final year of school and have been receiving an income support payment for a continuous period of at least two years prior, or have completed their final year of school and have received an income support payment for a continuous period of at least four years immediately prior.

1.77 Participation in the ParentsNext program may require that a person: attend playgroups or similar activities; complete further education and training (such as literacy and numeracy courses); or undertake referrals to services to address non-vocational barriers to employment like confidence building, health care or counselling.

1.78 A person who is a compulsory participant would also be subject to the targeted compliance framework under the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999. Under this framework, where an individual fails to comply with their participation obligations their payment may be suspended, and where they are deemed to have persistently failed to meet their obligations without a reasonable excuse, their payment may be reduced by 50 to 100 per cent for a period, suspended, or cancelled.

An individual may also be exempted from participation requirements due to specified
circumstances including domestic violence, temporary incapacity, and some caring responsibilities.\textsuperscript{10}

**Summary of initial assessment**

**Preliminary international human rights legal advice**

**Multiple rights**

1.79 This measure provides access to a program which is intended to provide early support to young parents with a lower level of educational attainment to help them plan and prepare for employment before their youngest child starts school, including by participating in educational activities or activities with their children. In this respect, it may engage and promote the rights to work, education, and the rights of the child. The right to work requires that, for full realisation of that right, steps should be taken by a State including 'technical and vocational guidance and training programs, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and productive employment'.\textsuperscript{11} The right to education provides that education should be accessible to all.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, as the measure is aimed at disrupting intergenerational disadvantage and reducing the risk of long-term welfare dependency for participating parents and their children, it may promote the rights of the child. Children have special rights under human rights law taking into account their particular vulnerabilities.\textsuperscript{13} These rights are protected under a number of treaties, particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

1.80 However, by making participation in the ParentsNext program compulsory, and providing that a person who fails to participate may have their parenting payment reduced, suspended or cancelled, this measure also engages and may limit several other human rights including the rights to: social security; an adequate standard of living; and a private life.\textsuperscript{14} These rights may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to (that is, likely to achieve) that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective. The measure also engages and limits the right to equality and non-discrimination. Differential treatment (including the differential effect of a measure that is neutral on its face) will not constitute unlawful discrimination if the differential treatment is

\textsuperscript{10} Social Security Act 1991, Chapter 2, Part 2.10, Division 3A.

\textsuperscript{11} International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 6(2).

\textsuperscript{12} International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 13.

\textsuperscript{13} Convention on the Rights of the Child. See also, UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No. 17: Article 24* (1989) [1].

\textsuperscript{14} If the right to an adequate standard of living is limited in this context, such that it restricts the capacity of a parent to provide for the basic needs for their child, this would also engage and limit the rights of the child.
based on reasonable and objective criteria such that it serves a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.15

1.81 Further information is required in order to assess the compatibility of this measure with the rights to social security, an adequate standard of living, privacy and equality and non-discrimination, in particular:

(a) what percentage of participants in the ParentsNext program are: Indigenous; from a culturally and linguistically diverse background; or identify as a person with disability;

(b) how reducing, suspending or cancelling a person's parenting payment where they fail to participate in the ParentsNext program would be effective to remove barriers to employment and education, and stabilise family life for those participants;

(c) how many compulsory participants in the ParentsNext program have had their payments suspended, reduced or cancelled, and what is the average duration in each case;

(d) how it is proportionate to the stated aim of this measure to reduce, suspend or cancel a participant's parenting payments for a failure to meet their engagement requirements under the ParentsNext program;

(e) whether other, less rights restrictive alternatives to compulsory participation have been considered, and why other, less rights restrictive alternatives (such as voluntary participation, or voluntary participation incentivised by an additional financial payment) would not be effective to achieve the stated aims of the measure; and

(f) what safeguards are in place to ensure that persons whose parenting payment is reduced, suspended or cancelled following a mutual obligation failure have funds available to meet their basic needs, and those of their children.

Committee’s initial view

1.82 The committee noted that the ParentsNext program is intended to provide early support to young parents with a lower level of educational attainment to help them plan and prepare for employment before their youngest child starts school, and as such, this program would appear to engage and promote a number of human rights, including the rights to work, education, and the rights of the child.

15 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination (1989) [13]; see also Althammer v Austria, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 998/01 (2003) [10.2].
1.83 However, the committee noted that making this participation compulsory, and causing a person's parenting payment to be reduced, suspended or cancelled should they fail to appropriately engage in the program, may engage and limit the rights to: social security, an adequate standard of living; a private life; and equality and non-discrimination. The committee noted that these rights may be permissibly limited where a limitation is reasonable, proportionate and necessary.

1.84 The committee considered that further information was required to assess the human rights implications of this bill, and as such sought the minister's advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [1.81].

1.85 The full initial analysis is set out in Report 2 of 2021.

Minister's response

1.86 The minister advised:

ParentsNext is a highly successful pre-employment program that helps parents plan and prepare for employment before their youngest child starts school. Parents receive personalised assistance to help them identify their education and employment goals, improve their work readiness and link them to services in the local community.

The Instrument streamlines eligibility requirements for ParentNext participants from 1 July 2021. The changes to eligibility will better support those parents most in need and ensure all participants have access to financial assistance to help them achieve their education and employment goals. The Participation Fund, a flexible pool of funds to support work preparation expenses of participants, and access to wage subsidies will be available to all participants. This assistance is currently only available to those in the Intensive stream (40 per cent of participants).

This Instrument does not introduce compulsory participation or the Targeted Compliance Framework (TCF) to ParentsNext participants. The TCF has applied to ParentsNext participants since the national roll-out of the program on 1 July 2018.

In relation to the Committee's request for further information regarding participation requirements for ParentsNext, please find my responses below.

(a) what percentage of participants in the ParentsNext program are: Indigenous; from a culturally and linguistically diverse background; or identify as a person with disability

16 The minister's response to the committee's inquiries was received on 12 March 2021. This is an extract of the response. The response is available in full on the committee's website at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights/Scrutiny_reports.
Percentage of ParentsNext participants by Indigenous, CALD, and Disability status as at 28 February 2021*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>18 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALD</td>
<td>21 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons with Disability</td>
<td>15 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A participant who identifies with more than one of the above characteristics is included separately in each column

(b) how reducing, suspending or cancelling a person's parenting payment where they fail to participate in the ParentsNext program would be effective to remove barriers to employment and education, and stabilise family life for those participants

This instrument makes no changes to the program's participation requirements or consequences for non-compliance. Compulsory participation in active labour market programs has been shown to result in significantly better outcomes for participants.

ParentsNext continues to demonstrate positive outcomes for parents. Between 1 July 2018 and 28 February 2021:

- 69,528 participants had commenced education;
- 35,153 participants had commenced employment; and
- 4,909 participants had exited the program after achieving stable employment.

Participants are protected from lasting impacts to their payment by safeguards built into the TCF which is designed to give participants every opportunity to meet the mutual obligations that they have agreed with their provider (see further information below).

(c) how many compulsory participants in the ParentsNext program have had their payments suspended, reduced or cancelled, and what is the average duration in each case

Payment suspensions occur when a participant does not meet their participation requirements. Suspensions are lifted with full back-pay once a participant contacts their provider with a valid reason—for example if they or their child is/was unwell. As income support payments are made fortnightly, payment suspensions typically do not result in any delay in the person accessing their payment.

Since 7 December 2020, participants have two business days' 'resolution time' to contact their provider to discuss why they were unable to meet their participation requirement, or to reengage. Where this occurs, there is no payment suspension. For ParentsNext this has resulted in 35 per cent fewer payment suspensions.
Before ParentsNext participants face any lasting penalty for not meeting their requirements, they attend two assessments to ensure their requirements are appropriate for their circumstances and there is no undisclosed information affecting their capacity to meet requirements. One of these assessments is undertaken by the participant's provider, the other by Services Australia.

Payment reductions and cancellations are targeted to only those participants who have not met their requirements on at least five prior occasions, without a valid reason. As at 28 February 2021, ParentsNext has assisted more than 156,000 parents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ParentsNext compliance events 2 July 2018 – 28 February 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Payment Suspensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Payment Reductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Payment Cancellations*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If a person's payment remains on hold for more than 28 days, their income support payment is cancelled, and they must reapply

(d) how it is proportionate to the stated aim of this measure to reduce, suspend or cancel a participant's parenting payments for a failure to meet their engagement requirements under the ParentsNext program

ParentsNext is designed with a focus on meeting the needs of parents. It is flexible, recognises parents' caring responsibilities, does not require them to look for work, and incorporates family friendly sites and activities.

ParentsNext participants are only required to attend a quarterly appointment with their provider. Aside from this quarterly appointment, participants are required to negotiate and agree to a participation plan which identifies education and employment goals, and participate in an agreed activity to assist in working towards those goals. Activities range from attending playgroups or similar activities, which provide social connections and networking opportunities for parents with limited work history, and significant non-vocational barriers, through to further education and training for parents who are work ready. Activities are agreed between the participant and provider and must take into account the participant's personal circumstances, including caring responsibilities. There is no minimum hourly participation requirement.
Compulsory requirements have been shown to be very effective in enabling participants to achieve significantly better outcomes. The achievement of better outcomes for participants is directly relevant to the stated aims of the ParentsNext program.

Where parents are genuinely unable to participate exemptions from requirements can be applied by the provider or Services Australia. There are a range of reasons why exemptions can be applied including due to domestic violence, caring responsibilities, sickness or injury.

(e) whether other, less rights restrictive alternatives to compulsory participation have been considered, and why other, less rights restrictive alternatives (such as voluntary participation, or voluntary participation incentivised by an additional financial payment) would not be effective to achieve the stated aims of the measure

Evidence from earlier similar pilots to the current ParentsNext program (Helping Young Parents and Supporting Jobless Families) in Australia showed significantly better results when the activity requirements were compulsory. Participating in Helping Young Parents (where participating in activities was compulsory) increased the chance of a person attaining a Year 12 or equivalent qualification by 14 percentage points, compared with a more modest 3 percentage points in Supporting Jobless Families (where participation in activities was voluntary).

ParentsNext is designed to engage the most disadvantaged parents. Parents who have experienced long-term disadvantages may not be fully aware of the program’s benefits and opportunities for further support, and as a result can be reluctant to participate voluntarily. While parents can volunteer to participate, they rarely do. Since 1 July 2018 only 946 parents have volunteered to participate in the program.

While the most disadvantaged parents are less likely to seek assistance to improve their education or work readiness, program evidence shows that approximately 75 per cent of ParentsNext participants—that is, highly disadvantaged parents—report an improvement in their motivation to achieve their work or study goals. Additionally, the evaluation of the ParentsNext program found that a ParentsNext participant was 6.9 percentage points more likely to participate in employment than a comparable parent who did not participate in the program.

Compulsory participation requirements are necessary to ensure that the most disadvantaged parents receive the support they need. While an incentive based approach may encourage some parents to volunteer, it would be significantly less effective in targeting support to those most in need.

(f) what safeguards are in place to ensure that persons whose parenting payment is reduced, suspended or cancelled following a mutual
obligation failure have funds available to meet their basic needs, and those of their children

The TCF is designed to ensure only participants who are persistently and wilfully non-compliant incur financial penalties while providing protections for the most vulnerable.

Suspensions and penalties under the TCF only affect payments made in respect to the person themselves, such as Parenting Payment. Payments and supplements paid for the support of a person’s children such as Family Tax Benefit (FTB) and child care assistance are not affected by the application of the TCF. Rent Assistance for parents is almost always paid through FTB, so it would also be unaffected by any penalties. The rate of payments and supplements paid for the support of a person’s child depends on the individual and family circumstances.

Committee view

1.87 The committee thanks the minister for this response. The committee notes that this legislative instrument specifies a class of persons receiving parenting payment, who may be required to participate in the ParentsNext pre-employment program in order to remain eligible for the payment.

1.88 The committee considers further information is required to fully assess the compatibility of this legislative instrument with human rights. The committee has therefore resolved to conduct a short inquiry into this instrument. The committee is particularly interested in seeking evidence in relation to the following issues:

(a) whether and how it has been demonstrated that participants in the ParentsNext program who have had their Parenting Payment reduced, suspended or cancelled for non-compliance are able to meet their basic needs (and those of their children) in practice, such that they have an adequate standard of living, and whether and how this is assessed before payments may be affected;

(b) the extent to which the ParentsNext program operates flexibly in practice, such that it treats different cases differently (including for parents in regional areas and Indigenous parents);

(c) the extent to which participation in the ParentsNext program meets its stated objectives of effectively addressing barriers to education and employment for young parents in practice, and whether making participation compulsory is effective to achieve those objectives;

(d) what consultation has there been with Indigenous groups in relation to the compulsory participation of Indigenous peoples in the ParentsNext program;

(e) whether, and based on what evidence, it has been demonstrated that less rights restrictive alternatives to compulsory participation (such as
(f) the extent to which linking welfare payments to the performance of certain activities by the welfare recipient is consistent with international human rights law, particularly the rights to social security, an adequate standard of living, equality and non-discrimination, a private life, and the rights of the child.

1.89 The committee notes that the disallowance period for this legislative instrument ends in the Senate on 11 May 2021.\(^{17}\) The committee notes that the disallowance procedure is the primary mechanism by which the Parliament may exercise control over delegated legislation. As the committee has agreed to conduct an inquiry into the instrument, the committee has resolved to place a protective notice of motion to disallow the instrument, to extend the disallowance period by a further 15 sitting days (to 11 August 2021) in order to protect parliamentary control over the instrument pending completion of the committee's inquiry.

1.90 The committee will conclude on this matter once it has concluded its inquiry.

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\(^{17}\) The disallowance period for this legislative instrument ended in the House of Representatives on 22 March 2021.
Bills and instruments with no committee comment

1.91 The committee has no comment in relation to the following bills which were introduced into the Parliament between 22 to 25 March 2021. This is on the basis that the bills do not engage, or only marginally engage, human rights; promote human rights; and/or permissibly limit human rights:

- Broadcasting Legislation Amendment (2021 Measures No. 1) Bill 2021;
- Charter of Budget Honesty Amendment (Rural and Regional Australia Statements) Bill 2021;
- Competition and Consumer Amendment (Motor Vehicle Service and Repair Information Sharing Scheme) Bill 2021;
- Mitochondrial Donation Law Reform (Maeve’s Law) Bill 2021; and
- Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Amendment (No New Fossil Fuels) Bill 2021.

1.92 The committee has examined the legislative instruments registered on the Federal Register of Legislation between 3 to 21 March 2021. The committee has reported on one legislative instrument from this period earlier in this chapter. The committee has determined not to comment on the remaining instruments from this period on the basis that the instruments do not engage, or only marginally engage, human rights; promote human rights; and/or permissibly limit human rights.

Private Member’s bill that may limit human rights

1.93 The committee notes that the following private member’s bill appears to engage and may limit human rights. Should this bill proceed to further stages of debate, the committee may request further information from the legislation proponent as to the human rights compatibility of the bill:

- Commonwealth Environment Protection Authority Bill 2021.

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1 This section can be cited as Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Bills and instruments with no committee comment, Report 5 of 2021; [2021] AUPJCHR 49.

2 Inclusion in the list is based on an assessment of the bill and relevant information provided in the statement of compatibility accompanying the bill. The committee may have determined not to comment on a bill notwithstanding that the statement of compatibility accompanying the bill may be inadequate.

3 The committee examines all legislative instruments registered in the relevant period, as listed on the Federal Register of Legislation. To identify all of the legislative instruments scrutinised by the committee during this period, select 'legislative instruments' as the relevant type of legislation, select the event as 'assent/making', and input the relevant registration date range in the Federal Register of Legislation’s advanced search function, available at: https://www.legislation.gov.au/AdvancedSearch.
Chapter 2

Concluded matters

2.1 This chapter considers responses to matters raised previously by the committee. The committee has concluded its examination of these matters on the basis of the responses received.

2.2 Correspondence relating to these matters is available on the committee's website.¹

Bills

Online Safety Bill 2021²

Online Safety (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2021

| Purpose | The Online Safety Bill 2021 seeks to create a new framework for online safety in Australia, and establish an eSafety Commissioner with the powers to investigate complaints and objections.
| Portfolio | Communications, Urban Infrastructure, Cities and the Arts
| Introduced | House of Representatives, 24 February 2021
| Rights | Rights of women; rights of the child; privacy; freedom of expression; life; prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and criminal process rights

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² This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Online Safety Bill 2021 and Online Safety (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2021, Report 5 of 2021; [2021] AUPJCHR 50.
2.3 The committee requested a response from the minister in relation to the bill in Report 3 of 2020.³

Removal of, and disabling of access to, online content

2.4 This bill seeks to establish a new framework for online safety for people in Australia, enabling the minister to determine basic online safety expectations for social media services, electronic services (for example, SMS, chat or other communication services), or internet services (including those which allow individuals to access material online).⁴

2.5 The bill would also establish the office of the eSafety Commissioner (the Commissioner) to administer: a complaints system for cyber-bullying material targeting an Australian child and cyber-abuse material targeting an Australian adult; and a complaints and objection system for non-consensual sharing of intimate images (including images depicting nudity).⁵ The Commissioner would also be empowered to enforce online safety by issuing blocking notices, link deletion notices, or app removal notices, to require the removal of online materials depicting abhorrent violent conduct, and certain pornographic and other materials depicting sexual or violent content. Non-compliance would be punishable by a range of civil penalty provisions and enforced through the adoption of enforcement powers contained in the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014. The bill would also empower the Commissioner to develop industry standards requiring compliance, and enable bodies and associations representing sections of the online industry to also develop their own self-regulatory industry codes.⁶

Summary of initial assessment

Preliminary international human rights legal advice

Rights of the child, rights of women, rights to privacy and freedom of expression

2.6 The bill seeks to enhance the safety of Australian children and adults on the internet by establishing a legislative framework for receiving and investigating individual complaints about online bullying and abuse, and the posting of intimate images without a person's consent. In particular, it seeks to facilitate the timely resolution of complaints about cyber-bullying of children. The bill also seeks to enhance online safety for Australians more generally by establishing mechanisms by

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⁴ Part 4. These terms are defined in clauses 13–14.
⁵ The office of the eSafety Commissioner already exists under the Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015. That legislation would be repealed with the intention of replacing the scheme with this bill and the associated Online Safety (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2021.
⁶ Part 9, Division 7.
which the Commissioner may require the speedy removal of violent and offensive material, and ensure that individuals do not view such material. It also seeks to build-in flexibility to adapt the scheme to address emerging online harms, including by providing for the development of legislative instruments at a later time.

2.7 As such, the proposed scheme is likely to promote numerous human rights, including the right of women to be free from sexual exploitation, the rights of the child and the right to privacy and reputation. The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council has stated that the human rights which people have offline must also be protected online.\(^7\) International human rights law recognises that women are vulnerable to sexual exploitation, particularly online, and that States Parties have particular obligations with respect to combatting sources of such exploitation.\(^8\)

2.8 Children also have special rights under human rights law taking into account their particular vulnerabilities,\(^9\) including the right to protection from all forms of violence, maltreatment or sexual exploitation.\(^10\) The international community has recognised the importance of creating a safer online environment for children,\(^11\) and noted the need to establish regulation frameworks which enable users to report concerns about content.\(^12\)

2.9 In addition, international human rights law recognises that the right to privacy must also be protected online. The right to privacy is multi-faceted. It protects against arbitrary and unlawful interferences with an individual's privacy and attacks on reputation.\(^13\) It can also be considered as the presumption that individuals should have an area of autonomous development, interaction and liberty, a 'private sphere' with

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10 See, Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 19, 34, and 36.


13 There is international case law to indicate that this protection only extends to attacks which are unlawful. See *RLM v Trinidad and Tobago*, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 380/89 (1993); and *IP v Finland*, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 450/91 (1993).
or without interaction with others, free from excessive unsolicited intervention by other uninvited individuals.\textsuperscript{14}

2.10 While the proposed measure appears to promote these rights, in order to achieve its important objectives, it also necessarily engages and limits the right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, either orally, in writing or print, in the form of art, or through any other media of an individual's choice.\textsuperscript{15} It is not an absolute right. While the right to \textit{hold} an opinion may never be permissibly limited under law,\textsuperscript{16} the right to freedom of expression (that is, the freedom to \textit{manifest} one's beliefs or opinions) can be limited.\textsuperscript{17} For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly provides that the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.\textsuperscript{18} The International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also requires States to make it an offence to disseminate 'ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin'.\textsuperscript{19} These provisions are understood as constituting compulsory limitations on the right to freedom of expression.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item[15] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 19(2).
\item[16] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 19(1).
\item[17] Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities, and may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: for respect of the rights or reputations of others; for the protection of national security or of public order; or of public health or morals.
\item[18] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 20(2).
\item[19] International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, article 4(a). Where each of the treaty provisions above refer to prohibition by law, and offence punishable by law, they refer to criminal prohibition. Although Australia has ratified these treaties, Australia has made reservations in relation to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in relation to its inability to legislate for criminal prohibitions on race hate speech.
\end{itemize}
2.11 The right to freedom of expression may be permissibly limited where a measure seeks to achieve a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to (that is, effective to achieve) that objective, and is a proportionate means by which to achieve it.

2.12 As discussed at paragraph [2.6], this bill seeks to achieve a number of important objectives, with the overarching goal of enhancing the online safety of Australians. Several key components of the proposed scheme—relating to the removal of intimate images posted without consent, and material constituting cyber-bullying of an Australian child—would appear to be clearly effective to achieve that objective and, considering the nature of the content being targeted, would likely constitute a proportionate means by which to achieve it. The bill expressly provides that it does not apply to the extent that it would infringe any constitutional doctrine of implied freedom of political expression, which is a useful safeguard. Further, with respect to public oversight of the Commissioner’s functions, the bill requires the tabling of an annual report in Parliament.

2.13 However, the bill also seeks to deal with further distinct types of online content, which necessitates an analysis of whether the proposed regulation of access to that content would constitute a proportionate means by which to achieve the important objectives of this bill in each case. This requires consideration of: the extent of the interference with the right to freedom of expression; whether the proposed limitation is sufficiently circumscribed; the presence of sufficient safeguards; and whether any less rights restrictive alternatives could achieve the same stated objective.

**Material relating to abhorrent violent conduct**

2.14 Part 8 of the bill would enable the Commissioner to either request or require that an internet service provider (ISP) block access to material that promotes, incites, instructs or depicts ‘abhorrent violent conduct’, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the availability of the material online is likely to cause significant harm to the Australian community. This necessarily limits the right to freedom of expression (while also promoting the rights set out above). Part 8 is clearly intended to provide an important mechanism for the speedy removal of material relating to violent

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21 Part 16, clause 233.
22 Part 11, clause 183.
23 See also the initial analysis of material constituting cyber abuse of an Australian adult: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, *Report 3 of 2021* (17 March 2021), pp. 7–10.
24 A person engages in ‘abhorrent violent conduct’ if they: engage in a terrorist act; murder (or attempt to murder) another person; or torture, rape or kidnap another person. *Criminal Code Act 1995*, section 474.32.
25 Part 8, clause 95.
conduct with the potential to traumatis or radicalise those who view it. This would clearly constitute a very important and legitimate objective, and the measure would appear effective to achieve this objective. In order to assess the proportionality of this measure with the right to freedom of expression, further information is required, in particular:

(a) what is meant by the term 'significant harm' and what guidance would be provided to the Commissioner in determining what reaches the threshold of 'significant harm' (as opposed to 'harm') in practice;

(b) whether material which could be used to inform journalistic analysis of violent incidents (for example, raw protest footage filmed by participants, or footage of violent police misconduct) but which was not itself made by a journalist, would be exempt from removal by the Commissioner;

(c) what guidance would be provided to the Commissioner, and what factors would they take into consideration, in determining whether access to material is in the public interest;

(d) what range of steps the Commissioner could specify in a blocking notice or request (beyond those examples in subclauses 95(2) and 99(2)), and what limits (if any) are there on the steps which the Commissioner could request or require;

(e) why the bill does not specify that the Commissioner may require the removal of an individual piece of content (or class of content), rather than requiring the blocking of an entire domain or URL, where satisfied that this would be effective;

(f) why it would not be as effective to provide for an interim blocking notice of short duration—with no requirement for procedural fairness—together with the power to issue a blocking notice of longer duration, but only where the internet service provider or other relevantly affected person has been provided with the opportunity to make a submission as to the content in question; and

(g) why the Commissioner would not be required to revoke a blocking notice or request should circumstances relevantly change prior to its original expiration.

Regulation of online content - class 1 and 2 materials

2.15 Part 9 of the bill would enable the Commissioner to require that a social media service, electronic service, designated internet service, or a hosting service provider remove, or otherwise deny access to, two classes of material on their services:

- 'Class 1 material' refers to a film or publication (or the contents of such), computer game, or other material which has been refused classification (or
classified 'RC') under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995, or which would likely be refused classification.

- 'Class 2 material' which refers to:
  - material that has been, or would likely be, classified X 18+ and category 2 restricted material (referred to in the explanatory memorandum as mainstream pornography); and
  - material depicting violence, implied sexual violence, simulated sexual activity, coarse language, drug use and nudity that is not suitable for persons under 18 years (hereafter referred to as 'less serious Class 2 material').

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26 A film, publication or computer game will be classified as 'RC' where it: describes, depicts, expresses or otherwise deals with matters of sex, drug misuse or addiction, crime, cruelty, violence or revolting or abhorrent phenomena in such a way that it offends against the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults to the extent that it should not be classified; or describes or depicts in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult, a person who is, or appears to be, a child under 18 (whether the person is engaged in sexual activity or not); or promotes, incites or instructs in matters of crime or violence. National Classification Code (May 2005), sections 2–4. With respect to films see also Guidelines for the Classification of Films 2012, which provides that a film will be classified RC where it contains bestiality; or gratuitous exploitative or offensive depictions of activity accompanied by fetishes or practices which are considered abhorrent.

27 Part 9, clause 106.

28 The catch-all term 'mainstream pornography' is used in the explanatory memorandum, at page 124, to refer to this content. That is, a film (or contents of), or another material, which has been, or would likely be, classified X 18+ (meaning that it contains real depictions of actual sexual activity between consenting adults in which there is no violence, no sexual violence, sexualised violence, coercion, sexually assaultive language, or fetishes or depictions which purposefully demean anyone involved in that activity for the enjoyment of viewers, in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult; and which is unsuitable for a minor to see). Alternatively, a publication that is (or would be) classified 'Category 2 restricted' (meaning that it explicitly depicts sexual or sexually related activity between consenting adults in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult; or depicts, describes or expresses revolting or abhorrent phenomena in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult and is unsuitable for a minor to see or read). See, National Classification Code (May 2005).

29 That is, a film (or contents of); a computer game which has been, or would likely be classified R 18+ (meaning that it is unsuitable for viewing or playing by a minor); or a publication (or contents of) which has been (or would likely be) classified 'Category 1 restricted' (meaning that it explicitly depicts nudity, or describes or impliedly depicts sexual or sexually related activity between consenting adults, in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult; or describes or expresses in detail violence or sexual activity between consenting adults in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult; or is unsuitable for a minor to see or read). See, National Classification Code (May 2005).
2.16 In addition to promoting the rights of women, the child and privacy (as set out above), blocking access to such material necessarily limits the right to freedom of expression. As noted above, the right to freedom of expression may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

2.17 The objective of restricting access to seriously harmful content would likely be legitimate for the purposes of international human rights law. In order to assess the compatibility of this measure with the right to freedom of expression, further information is required, and in particular:

(a) what evidence demonstrates that the full range of materials which would fall within Classes 1 and 2 (in particular, material depicting consensual sex between adults) would be harmful to adult end-users;

(b) why the Commissioner would be empowered to require the removal of mainstream pornography, rather than requiring that it must be accessible only via a restricted access system;

(c) why the bill could not require that the Commissioner must consider the purpose for which that content was published (for example, an educative, academic, medical, or health-related purpose); whether it would be in the public interest to remove material (on the basis that it may be unsuitable for a child to view, but may be reasonable for an adult to have access to); and how the interests of affected parties and end users would be affected;

(d) what types of systems the Commissioner could declare a 'restricted access system', and whether these would require the provision of personal information in order to log in; and

(e) in order to ensure procedural fairness, why this scheme could not instead provide for the issue of an interim removal, link-deletion, app removal, or remedial notice, followed by a further order only once the relevant service had been given the opportunity to make submissions as to the appropriateness of the content remaining accessible.

**Committee’s initial view**

2.18 The committee noted that the Online Safety Bill 2021 is likely to promote numerous human rights. The committee considered that ensuring the safety of Australians online is a significant and evolving challenge, and notes that some Australians—including women and children—are particularly vulnerable to harms online, including sexual exploitation.

2.19 The committee also noted that, by regulating and disabling access to certain harmful online content, this bill necessarily engages and limits the right to freedom of expression. The committee noted that the right to freedom of expression is not
absolute, and may be permissibly limited where a limitation addresses a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to (that is, effective to achieve) that objective, and a proportionate means of doing so. The committee considered that the bill clearly seeks to achieve the important and legitimate objective of enhancing online safety for Australian adults and children in a number of ways, including by providing for the speedy removal of intimate images posted without the subject's consent, or material which constitutes cyber-bullying of an Australian child, and cyber-abuse of an Australian adult. The committee considered that these measures in general appear to permissibly limit the right to freedom of expression.

2.20 However, the committee noted that some clarification is required as to the potential scope of information, and means of regulating access to it, in relation to abhorrent online content, and some adult sexual content, in order to assess whether the proposed limitations with respect to blocking access to this content is proportionate to the objectives of the bill.

2.21 The committee considered further information was required to assess the human rights implications of this bill, and as such sought the minister's advice as to the matters set out at paragraphs [2.14] and [2.17].

2.22 The full initial analysis is set out in Report 3 of 2021.

Minister's response

2.23 The minister advised:

*Impact on Freedom of Expression*

a) what is meant by the term 'significant harm' and what guidance would be provided to the Commissioner in determining what reaches the threshold of 'significant harm' (as opposed to 'harm') in practice;

The intent of the power of the Commissioner to issue blocking requests or notices is to prevent the rapid distribution of abhorrent material online, as occurred, for example, after the 2019 terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand where the perpetrator streamed the attacks and the footage was shared on many sites.

This power is intended to be used under circumstances where such material is being disseminated online in a manner likely to cause significant harm to the Australian community and that warrants a rapid, coordinated and decisive response by the online industry.

While ‘significant harm’ is not defined in the Bill, it is a requirement the Commissioner have regard to the three criteria provided in subclauses 95(4)

30 The minister's response to the committee's inquiries was received on 1 April 2021. This is an extract of the response. The response is available in full on the committee's website at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights/Scrutiny_reports.
and 99(4) before making a determination that the material met this threshold. These criteria are the nature of the material, the number of end-users likely to access the material and such other matters as are relevant.

In terms of guidance provided to the Commissioner, it is the intention that these powers work in tandem with any protocol developed by the Commissioner, in consultation with ISPs and the Communications Alliance (a key industry organisation for the communications industry), that sets out detailed arrangements for how blocking requests and blocking notices will work.

It should also be noted that the issuing of blocking notices would be subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under subclause 220(13) and internal review under clause 220A which may provide persuasive guidance about the appropriate threshold of significant harm.

b) whether material which could be used to inform journalistic analysis of violent incidents (for example, raw protest footage filmed by participants, or footage of violent police misconduct) but which was not itself made by a journalist, would be exempt from removal by the Commissioner;

Part 8 of the Bill relates to powers of the Commissioner’s to issue blocking requests or notices to internet service providers rather than powers to issue removal notices.

Clause 104 of the Online Safety Bill sets out a range of material which would be exempt from the Commissioner’s power to request or require blocking. These are based on the defences available in the Criminal Code Act (at section 474.37). Paragraph 104(1)(e) of the Online Safety Bill provides for an exemption for material that relates to a news or current affairs report. There is no implication that the material would need to be created by the journalist involved – rather that material relates to a news report that is created by a professional journalist and is in the public interest. Further, journalistic analysis of material relating to protests of violent police misconduct may remain available given that paragraph 104(1)(h) includes an exemption for accessibility of material for the purpose of advocating for lawful procurement of a change to any matter established by law, policy or practice.

c) what guidance would be provided to the Commissioner, and what factors would they take into consideration, in determining whether access to material is in the public interest;

It is expected that news and current affairs reports provided by mainstream media sites would meet the public interest test as per clause 104(1)(e)(i).

No specific guidance would be provided to the Commissioner who would be expected to assess this on a case by case basis to balance the interest for the public to be informed about news and current affairs against the expectation that the public would be protected from gratuitous exposure to this material. It is expected that the Commissioner would form a view based
on such resources as the Press Council of Australia standards of practice and broadcasting codes of practice registered with the Australian Communications and Media.\textsuperscript{31}

It should also be noted that the issuing of blocking notices would be subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under subclause 220(13) and internal review under clause 220A.

d) what range of steps the Commissioner could specify in a blocking notice or request (beyond those examples in subclauses 95(2) and 99(2)), and what limits (if any) are there on the steps which the Commissioner could request or require;

There are no additional specifications or limits other than the examples specified in subclauses 95(2) and 99(2).

e) why the bill does not specify that the Commissioner may require the removal of an individual piece of content (or class of content), rather than requiring the blocking of an entire domain or URL, where satisfied that this would be effective;

This is not needed in Part 8 of the Bill because the powers of the Commissioner to order the removal of individual pieces of content are in other parts of the Bill. Clauses 95 and 99 require the Commissioner to have regard to whether any other powers conferred on the Commissioner (such as the removal notices for class 1 material under Part 9 or the AVM notice power under the Criminal Code) could be used to minimise the likelihood that the availability of the material online could cause significant harm to the Australian community. The intention is that this power be used if this is the most effective mechanism to stop the potential harm to a large number of end-users quickly.

f) why it would not be as effective to provide for an interim blocking notice of short duration—with no requirement for procedural fairness—together with the power to issue a blocking notice of longer duration, but only where the internet service provider or other relevantly affected person has been provided with the opportunity to make a submission as to the content in question; and

It is anticipated that in the first instance, the Commissioner would issue a voluntary blocking request. There are no sanctions for non-compliance with a blocking request and the Commissioner may also revoke such a request. Each blocking request must only remain in force for a maximum of 3 months.

It is intended that where an ISP does not comply with a blocking request, the Commissioner may consider issuing a blocking notice. Non-compliance with the requirements under a blocking notice attracts a civil penalty and

\textsuperscript{31} Standards and codes for TV and radio broadcasters | ACMA
other enforcement mechanisms. Each blocking notice must only remain in force for a maximum of 3 months.

The proposal for an interim blocking notice would be inconsistent with the intent of proposed blocking request and blocking notice powers. Blocking requests and notices are designed to be time-limited to minimise any adverse effects on blocked domains while still achieving the purpose of preventing the harmful proliferation of material that depicts, promotes, incites or instructs in abhorrent violent conduct. Although the maximum time for a blocking notice is three months, it is more likely that the Commissioner would revoke them much sooner than this when the material is no longer available (under clauses 97 and 99).

As noted above, a decision of the Commissioner to issue of blocking notices would be subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under subclause 220(13) and internal review under the internal review scheme that is required by clause 220A.

g) why the Commissioner would not be required to revoke a blocking notice or request should circumstances relevantly change prior to its original expiration.

Clause 97 provides the Commissioner with the power to revoke a blocking request. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the Commissioner may use this power if the domain or URL ceases to host material subject to the blocking request or if sufficient time has passed to reduce the likelihood of the material reaching a large number of end-users. Similarly, clause 101 provides the Commissioner with the power to revoke a blocking notice.

Online Content Scheme

a) what evidence demonstrates that the full range of materials which would fall within Classes 1 and 2 (in particular, material depicting consensual sex between adults) would be harmful to adult end-users;

The Bill relies on the categories set out in the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Classification Act). To the extent possible, the principles and community standards that underpin the classification system also underpin the Bill. These principles include that adults should be able to read, hear, see and play what they want and children should be protected from material that may harm or disturb them. The Bill does not prohibit adults from viewing class 2 material online which includes material depicting consensual sex between adults. As described in more detail below, it limits the availability of class 2 material that would be classified ‘X18+’ material to sites hosted overseas and requires class 2 material provided from Australia, that would be classified ‘R18+’, to be behind a system limiting access to those under 18 years of age.

Class 1 material is material that has been, or is likely to be, classified ‘Refused Classification’ under the Classification Act. It contains content that is very high in impact and falls outside generally accepted community standards. It includes non-consensual sexual activity, for example
descriptions or depictions of child sexual abuse or any other exploitative or offensive descriptions or depictions involving a person who is, or appears to be, a child under 18 years, promotion or provision of instruction in paedophile activity, sexual violence and bestiality. It also includes gratuitous, exploitative or offensive depictions of fetishes or practices which are offensive or abhorrent or incest fantasies or other fantasies which are offensive or abhorrent. Offline, films, computer games and publications that are classified ‘Refused Classification’ cannot be sold, hired, advertised or legally imported in Australia. To the extent possible, the approach taken to this type of material under the Bill is consistent with the offline approach. That is, it should not be accessible to Australian end-users and is subject to removal notices.

Class 2 material may be material that has been, or would likely be, classified 'X18+' or 'Category 2 Restricted' under the Classification Act. This content contains real depictions of actual sexual intercourse and other sexual activity between consenting adults. Any depictions of non-adult persons or adult persons who look like they are under 18 years or portrayed to be minors are not permitted. No violence, coercion or sexually assaultive language is permitted. Fetishes such as body piercing, application of substances such as candle wax, 'golden showers', bondage, spanking or fisting are also not permitted. Offline, X18+ material is restricted to adults and is only available for sale or hire in the Australian Capital Territory and some parts of the Northern Territory. Category 2 Restricted publications may not be publicly displayed and may only be displayed in premises that are restricted to adults such as adult shops. To the extent possible, the approach taken with respect to this type of material under the Bill is consistent with the approach taken offline. That is, in the offline world this type of material should not be displayed in public spaces where it can be accessed by children and online it would be subject to removal notices where available on a service provided from Australia. This approach also recognises the jurisdictional limitations in enforcing Australian community standards overseas.

Class 2 material may also be material that has been, or would likely be, classified 'R18+' or 'Category 1 Restricted' under the Classification Act. This material is considered to be unsuitable for minors and may offend some sections of the adult community. Both offline and online this type of material must be restricted to adults. This is consistent with the principles that adults should be able to read, hear, see and play what they want, minors should be protected from material likely to harm or disturb them and everyone should be protected from exposure to unsolicited material they find offensive.

b) why the Commissioner would be empowered to require the removal of mainstream pornography, rather than requiring that it must be accessible only via a restricted access system;
See above - to the extent possible, the approach taken with respect to mainstream pornography under the Bill is consistent with the approach taken offline. That is, it should not be displayed in public spaces where it can be accessed by children and is subject to removal notices where available on a service provided from Australia. The approach also recognises the jurisdictional limitations in enforcing Australian community standards overseas and does not seek to remove X18+ material from services provided from overseas.

This treatment of mainstream pornography under the Bill has not changed - it is the same as the current approach under Schedules 5 and 7 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. That is, X18+ material must not be provided from or hosted within Australia and is subject to removal notices by the eSafety Commissioner.

c) why the bill could not require that the Commissioner must consider the purpose for which that content was published (for example, an educative, academic, medical, or health related purpose); whether it would be in the public interest to remove material (on the basis that it may be unsuitable for a child to view, but may be reasonable for an adult to have access to); and how the interests of affected parties and end users would be affected;

The nature of the class 1 and class 2 material covered by the proposed online content scheme is such that unrestricted access would be harmful to Australians, particularly children, and accordingly to the extent that the Bill lawfully restricts freedom of speech through these provisions, those restrictions are reasonable, proportionate and necessary to achieve the legitimate objective of protecting Australians online.

In practice, the Commissioner would consider the context or purpose for which the material was published during an investigation, including whether it is in the public interest. Under clause 42 the Commissioner may conduct any investigation as they think fit and...may refuse to investigate a complaint under clause 43.

The approach taken under the Bill with respect to the removal of certain class 2 material provided from Australia is consistent with the approach taken to this type of material offline. Both online and offline systems seek to limit the provision of this type of material while recognising that adults have the right to read, see, hear and play what they want and minors should be protected from material that may harm or disturb them.

d) what types of systems the Commissioner could declare a 'restricted access system', and whether these would require the provision of personal information in order to log in;

Clause 108 of the Bill allows the Commissioner to declare by written instrument that a specified access control system or a class of such system is a ‘restricted access system’ in relation to online material for the purposes of the Bill. The purpose of a restricted access system declaration is not to
prevent access to age-restricted content, but to seek to ensure that access is limited to persons 18 years and over and that the methods used for limiting this access meet a minimum standard.

The Commissioner would consult with industry in the development of any restricted access system declaration made under the regime. Industry is best placed to consider the most appropriate system for restricting access to content on their services, including whether a particular system requires the provision of personal information to log in and what protections should be in place to secure that information.

e) in order to ensure procedural fairness, why this scheme could not instead provide for the issue of an interim removal, link-deletion, app removal, or remedial notice, followed by a further order only once the relevant service had been given the opportunity to make submissions as to the appropriateness of the content remaining accessible.

The interests of service providers are protected under the scheme through the review of decisions procedures provided by clauses 220 and 220A of the Bill.

Clause 220 provides for the review, by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), of certain decisions made by the Commissioner, and sets out who may make an application for such review.

Internal review of the Commissioner’s decisions is provided by clause 220A, under which the Commissioner must, by notifiable instrument, formulate a scheme for internal review of decisions of a kind referred to in clause 220. These decisions include review of a decision by the Commissioner under clauses 109, 110, 114, 115, 119, 120, 124 and 128.

Under subclause 220A (2) the internal review scheme may empower the Commissioner to, on application, review such a decision and affirm, vary or revoke the decision concerned.

Concluding comments

International human rights legal advice

Rights of the child, rights of women, rights to privacy and freedom of expression

Material relating to abhorrent violent conduct

2.24 Part 8 would enable the Commissioner to request or require that an internet service provider (ISP) block access to material that promotes, incites, instructs or
depicts 'abhorrent violent conduct', where satisfied that the availability of the material online is likely to cause significant harm to the Australian community.

2.25 As to the meaning of the term 'significant harm', the minister stated that, while the term is not defined, the Commissioner must have regard to: the nature of the material; the number of end-users who are likely to access it; and such other matters (if any) which they consider relevant. The minister stated that these powers are intended to operate in tandem with any protocol developed by the Commissioner, in consultation with ISPs and the Communications Alliance (an industry organisation). The minister advised that it is intended for the Commissioner's blocking request and notice powers to be used to prevent the rapid distribution of abhorrent materials online, such as the footage of the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack, where its dissemination would likely cause significant harm to the Australian community, and in circumstances which warrant a rapid, coordinated and decisive response by the online industry. If the exercise of this power is utilised in circumstances such as that provided in this example, having regard not merely to the nature of the content but also to the likelihood of its rapid distribution online, it appears that this aspect of the Commissioner's blocking request and notice powers may be sufficiently circumscribed.

2.26 As to the scope of materials that would be subject to the Commissioner's blocking powers, the minister advised that material that relates to a news report created by a journalist (but where the material was not itself created by the journalist), and that is regarded as being in the public interest, would be exempt. Based on the minister's response, this would appear to mean, therefore, that raw video footage of a violent conflict filmed by a non-journalist would not be blocked on the basis that it is likely to cause significant harm to the Australian community, where it is related to journalistic analysis of such conflict. The minister further stated that 'journalistic analysis of material relating to protests of violent police misconduct may remain available' given that paragraph 104(1)(h) includes an exemption for accessibility of material for the purpose of advocating for lawful procurement of a change to any matter established by law, policy or practice. The minister stated that no specific guidance would be given to the Commissioner in determining whether access to materials is in the 'public interest'. He advised that the Commissioner would be expected to assess this on a case by case basis, to balance the interest for the public to be informed about news and current affairs against the expectation that the public would be protected from 'gratuitous exposure' to material. The minister stated that it is expected that news and current affairs reports from mainstream media websites would meet the public interest test. The minister further stated that it is expected that

32 A person engages in 'abhorrent violent conduct' if they: engage in a terrorist act; murder (or attempt to murder) another person; or torture, rape or kidnap another person. Criminal Code Act 1995, section 474.32.

33 Part 8, clause 95.

34 These criteria are provided for in proposed subclauses 95(4) and 99(4).
the Commissioner would form a view based on resources such as the Australian Press Council Standards of Practice, and the Australian Communications and Media Authority’s Standards and Codes for TV and radio broadcasters. Clause 104 would, therefore, appear to have the capacity to serve as an important safeguard with respect to the continued availability of specific types of content depicting violence, where the availability has important social or legal utility.

2.27 As to the range of steps that the Commissioner could specify in a blocking notice or request, the minister stated that there are not additional specifications or limitations beyond those set out in subclauses 95(2) and 99(2). That is, a notice may specify steps to block domain names, URLs or IP addresses which provide access to the relevant material. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the term ‘the following are examples of steps that may be specified in a blocking request’ does not establish an exhaustive list of powers. Rather, these proposed subclauses provide three examples of steps that may be specified in a blocking notice or request (appearing to suggest that other steps of a different nature, and beyond these stated steps, could be specified). Further, it would appear likely that each of the stated examples would themselves consist of a series of more specific steps in practice, and because they are not specified in the bill it is not clear what they may entail. This raises some questions as to whether the Commissioner’s proposed blocking notice and request power is sufficiently constrained. The minister further stated that it is intended that the Commissioner will develop a protocol setting out detailed arrangements for how notices and requests would work. However, it is noted that this does not appear to be a legislative requirement.

2.28 Further information was also sought as to whether any less rights restrictive alternatives—such as providing for a content removal power, rather than a blocking power—would be as effective to achieve the aims of Part 8 of the bill. The minister advised that Part 8 of the bill does not specify that the Commissioner may require the removal of an individual piece of (or class of) content because the Commissioner has the power to do this in other parts of the bill, and must have regard to whether such other powers could instead be used.35 Given that the Commissioner’s removal notice powers in Part 9 of the bill operate in relation to content which would be refused classification under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995, this would appear to capture material relating to abhorrent violent conduct.36 In addition, the minister noted that the Criminal Code empowers the Commissioner to issue abhorrent violent material notices to content and hosting services.37 Such notices put a provider on notice that their services are being used to access or host abhorrent violent material, and establish a presumption in any future prosecution that

35 Subclauses 95(5) and 99(5).
36 See, Part 9.
37 Criminal Code Act 1995, Part 10.6, Subdivision H.
the provider was reckless as to whether that material could be accessed from their service.\(^{38}\) Given that the Commissioner would be required to turn their mind to the suitability of using any of these other powers before issuing a blocking notice or request, this may have the effect of limiting the use of the blocking power in practice, and would appear to serve as an important safeguard.

2.29 As to why it would not be as effective to provide for an interim blocking notice of short duration followed by a blocking notice of longer duration, the minister stated that an interim blocking notice would be inconsistent with the intent of the proposed blocking powers, which are designed to be time-limited but prevent the harmful proliferation of material related to abhorrent violent conduct. The minister stated that it is anticipated that, in the first instance, the Commissioner would issue a blocking request, and if this were not complied with, then subsequently consider issuing a blocking notice.\(^{39}\) However, this two-step process is not reflected in the bill itself.

2.30 Lastly, clarification was sought as to why the Commissioner would not be required to revoke a blocking notice or request should circumstances relevantly change prior to its original expiration. The minister stated that while such requests and notices can remain in force for up to three months, it is more likely that the Commissioner would revoke them sooner, once the material is no longer available. The minister noted that the Commissioner may use their power to revoke a blocking request or notice if the material ceases to be hosted, or if sufficient time has passed, to reduce the likelihood of the material reaching a large number of end-users. This has the capacity to serve as an important safeguard in practice, although it should be noted that the bill does not require the Commissioner to turn their mind to the ongoing necessity of a specific blocking request or notice.

2.31 In conclusion, it appears that the scope of the content which could be covered by the proposed abhorrent violent material blocking scheme is appropriately circumscribed, noting that clause 104 would appear to ensure that where the availability of such material has some important social or legal utility, this will not be liable to blocking. However, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the full range of steps which could be specified under a blocking notice or request is unclear, and the bill does not require the Commissioner to develop a process to specify this. This raises some questions as to the way this power may be exercised in practice. The minister has stated that it is anticipated that, in the first instance, the Commissioner would issue a blocking request (which carries no sanction for non-compliance), and if this were not complied with, then subsequently consider issuing a blocking notice. Given that advice, it would appear that the proportionality of the proposed scheme with

\(^{38}\) *Criminal Code Act 1995*, sections 474.35–474.36.

\(^{39}\) In this regard it is noted that the Commissioner has issued just 23 abhorrent violent content notices under the Criminal Code to date. See, Ms Julie Inman Grant, eSafety Commissioner, Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications (Estimates), *Hansard*, 23 March 2021, p. 117.
respect to the right to freedom of expression would be strengthened were this two-step approach to be reflected in the bill, while retaining a discretion to issue a blocking notice in urgent cases. Lastly, with respect to oversight of such decisions, the minister has noted the availability of both internal review, and merits review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (which is proposed as a government amendment to the bill). These are important safeguards which would appear to enable affected providers to seek review of notices or decisions with which they disagreed.

Regulation of online content – class 1 and 2 materials

2.32 Part 9 of the bill would enable the Commissioner to require that a social media service, electronic service, designated internet service, or a hosting service provider remove, or otherwise deny or restrict access to two classes of materials (which may be broadly described as depictions of serious sexual and criminal content; mainstream pornographic content; and less serious sexual and adult content).

2.33 Further information was sought in relation to the right to freedom of expression as to what evidence demonstrates that each aspect of the proposed scheme would be effective to achieve the stated objective of dealing with seriously harmful content, access to which, if unrestricted, would be harmful to Australians, particularly children. In particular, further information was sought as to the evidence that demonstrates that the full range of materials which would fall within Classes 1 and 2 (including material depicting consensual sex between adults) would be harmful to adult end-users. The minister advised that this scheme seeks to adopt the same regulatory approach to sexual content as available on films, computer games and publications: that some of the content should not be accessible to any Australian person, and some should not be displayed in public spaces where it can be accessed by children. The minister stated that class 1 material is material which has been, or is likely to be, refused classification under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 because it falls outside of generally accepted community standards, and may include depictions of fetishes or practices which are offensive. As to class 2 material (that is, mainstream pornography, and less serious sexual and adult content), the minister stated that this material is unsuitable for minors and may offend some sections of the adult community, and so access to it should be restricted.
to adults. The minister stated that this is consistent with the principles that adults should be able to read, hear, see and play what they want, minors should be protected from material likely to harm or disturb them, and everyone should be protected from unsolicited material they find offensive. However, the mere fact that a depiction of a sexual activity between consenting adults may fall outside of 'generally accepted community standards' does not appear to demonstrate that the viewing of such content by an adult will cause harm to them (noting that the consequence of an order made under Part 9 may be to deny to all internet users – not just children – access to such material). In addition, the bill would empower the Commissioner to require that less serious sexual content (including content depicting nudity) be removed or cease to be hosted. It is not clear that access to the full range of content which would fall within this category may necessarily cause harm to adults, or to children. As such, some questions remain as to whether and how specific aspects of the proposed online content scheme would be rationally connected (that is, effective to achieve) the objective of preventing harm.

2.34 As to whether this scheme would constitute a proportionate means by which to achieve its objective, further information was sought about why the Commissioner would be empowered to require the removal of mainstream pornography, rather than requiring that it must be accessible only via a restricted access system. The minister stated that the proposed approach with respect to mainstream pornography online is intended to be the same as that taken offline: that it should not be displayed in public places where it can be accessed by children. He noted that offline, mainstream pornographic material is only available for sale or hire in the Australian Capital Territory and parts of the Northern Territory. The minister further stated that, recognising the jurisdictional limitations preventing the requirement to remove mainstream pornography from services hosted overseas, the bill would only provide for the removal of mainstream pornographic content provided from or hosted within Australia. However, it is not clear that empowering the Commissioner to require the removal of mainstream pornographic content from an Australian website or hosting service would be a proportionate means by which to achieve the stated objective of ensuring that pornography is not displayed in 'public places'. In particular, it is not clear that the presence of mainstream sexual content on a specific website can be directly equated to the public display of pornography in a physical location such as a shop accessible by children (noting that parental control mechanisms can be utilised to prevent access to sexual content on websites, and that individual websites may themselves restrict access to their content). Further, given that the stated intention is to ensure that children cannot access mainstream pornographic content (among other

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43 However, the Commissioner would appear to be empowered to require the removal of class 2 materials, including mainstream pornographic content and material depicting nudity. Paragraphs 119(2)(f) and 120(1)(g) would, as matter of statutory interpretation, appear to permit the Commissioner to require that a service either restrict access to material behind a restricted access system or require that that it be removed.
content), and not to prevent adults from accessing such content, it would appear it may be equally as effective to instead empower the Commissioner to require that such content be accessible only via some form of restricted access system.

2.35 In terms of the manner in which these powers may be exercised in practice, further information was sought as to why the bill could not require that the Commissioner must consider: the purpose for which that content was published (for example, an educative, academic, medical, or health-related purpose); whether it would be in the public interest to remove material (on the basis that it may be unsuitable for a child to view, but may be reasonable for an adult to have access to); and how the interests of affected parties and end users would be affected. The minister noted that the Commissioner may conduct any investigation as they think fit pursuant to clause 42, and may also refuse to investigate a complaint under clause 43. The minister stated that in practice, the Commissioner would consider the context or purpose for which the material was published during an investigation, including whether it is in the public interest. However, the bill would not require the Commissioner to turn their mind to such matters in making these decisions. As such, it would appear that any safeguard value associated with the Commissioner's decision-making in this regard would be at their discretion. Where a measure limits a human right, discretionary or administrative safeguards alone may not be sufficient for the purpose of a permissible limitation under international human rights law. 44 This is because administrative and discretionary safeguards are less stringent than the protection of statutory processes and can be amended or removed at any time.

2.36 Further information was also sought as to the types of systems the Commissioner could declare (by written instrument) to be a 'restricted access system', and whether these would require the provision of personal information in order to login. The minister stated that the Commissioner would consult with industry in the development of such a declaration, including considerations of whether a particular system would require the provision of personal information to login. It remains unclear, therefore, as to what type of system could be declared, and whether a person would need to provide any personal information (such as their name, and date of birth) to access restricted content. In this regard it is relevant that there do not appear to be any international examples of a mandatory online scheme for age verification for online pornography. 45 This means that the extent to which such a restricted access system could interfere with a person's privacy is not clear at this stage, nor is the extent to which the requirement for certain content to be contained behind a

44 See, for example, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of movement (Art.12) (1999).

45 This matter has recently been considered at length in the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Protecting the age of innocence: Report of the inquiry into age verification for online wagering and online pornography (February 2020) pp. 46–60.
restricted access system may interfere with the right to freedom of expression (for example, by deterring adults from accessing it).  

2.37 Lastly, further information was sought as to why this scheme could not provide for the issue of an interim removal, link-deletion, app removal, or remedial notice, followed by a further order only once the relevant service had been given the opportunity to make submissions as to the appropriateness of the content remaining accessible. The minister stated that the interests of providers are protected under proposed new clauses 220 (which provides for review by the AAT), and 220A (which would require the Commissioner to establish an internal review scheme by notifiable instrument). The minister noted that such an internal review scheme may empower the Commissioner to review a decision, and subsequently to affirm, vary or revoke it. As such, these proposed review mechanisms may provide oversight of these powers, which may assist with the proportionality of the measure with respect to the right to freedom of expression. However, it should be noted that it is proposed that an internal review scheme to be established under clause 220A would be established by notifiable instrument, and so would not be liable to a human rights assessment.  

2.38 In conclusion, Part 9 of the bill seeks to deal with a very wide range of online content, from the most serious child sexual abuse material and terrorism-related content, through to less serious nude or consensual sexual-related content which is deemed unsuitable for a minor to see or read. It would permit the Commissioner to require the removal of class 1 and some class 2 materials, which includes all pornographic content. This is largely because the bill would import the existing scheme for classifying films, computers games and publications as set out in the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 and associated documents. While the stated objective of Part 9 is to protect people from harm, and requiring the removal of such content would clearly appear to be effective to protect children from harm, there are questions as to a causal nexus between the viewing of pornographic content by an adult and harm being caused to them. This is also relevant to the  

46 Mr David Kaye, special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, has previously expressed concern with respect to a proposed age verification scheme to access online pornographic content in the United Kingdom, noting that the character of the digital space differs from the context of offline classification, and the potential eradication of anonymous expression, as well as specific concerns with respect to the collection, storage and protection of personal information. See, correspondence to Mr Julian Braithwaite, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations (9 January 2017) https://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/UK_DigitalEconomyBill_OLGBR1.2017.pdf (accessed 14 April 2021).  

47 Clause 220A would be inserted as a proposed government amendment to the bill introduced in the Senate (sheet SW125).  

48 Subsection 7(a) of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 provides that the committee may examine bills and legislative instruments. This does not extend to notifiable instruments, which are a separate category of instrument under the Legislation Act 2003.
proportionality of the proposed scheme. In this regard, it remains unclear why, instead of requiring the removal of pornographic content, a less rights restrictive approach of requiring that pornographic content must only be accessible via a restricted access system (while retaining a discretion to require the removal of some more serious kinds of pornographic content) would not be as effective to achieve the stated objectives of the scheme, and to prevent children from accessing that content. In addition, it remains unclear what personal information, if any, a restricted access system may require an end-user to provide in order to access content. Further, while the minister has advised that in practice the Commissioner would consider the context or purpose for which such material was published in determining whether to issue a remedial notice, the bill would not require them to turn their mind to this, or to any specific matters (such as whether content depicting nudity has been produced for, or may serve, an educative function, including for children). As such, it does not appear that this power is sufficiently circumscribed, and it is not clear how the Commissioner would exercise their discretion to allow some content to remain accessible to all persons. It would appear to depend on how the Commissioner elected to exercise their broad discretionary powers in practice. As such, as currently drafted Part 9 of the bill does not appear to be a permissible limitation on the right to freedom of expression.

Committee view

2.39 The committee thanks the minister for this response. The committee notes the Online Safety Bill 2021 seeks to create a new framework for ensuring online safety in Australia and provide a new legislative authority for the Australian eSafety Commissioner, empowering them to investigate complaints and objections in relation to harmful online content against children and adults, and to require that certain harmful content must be removed, or access to it disabled or restricted. The committee notes that the Online Safety (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2021 would repeal the existing legislative authority for the Commissioner, as well as increasing the criminal penalties associated with two offences for using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence.

2.40 The committee notes that the extent of the eSafety Commissioner's work to date demonstrates the vital importance of their role, noting in particular that in September 2018, the eSafety Commissioner reported having undertaken more than 8,000 investigations into child abuse content, representing approximately 35,000 images and videos referred for removal. Consequently, the committee considers that this bill is likely to promote the rights of the child, including by protecting them from exposure to harmful materials online, and from cyber-bullying material. The committee also considers that the bill is likely to promote the right of women to be free from sexual exploitation, and the right to privacy and reputation, including by providing for the removal of cyber-abuse material targeting an Australian adult, and of non-consensual intimate images.

2.41 The committee also notes that, by regulating and disabling access to certain harmful online content, this bill necessarily engages and limits the right to freedom
of expression. The committee notes that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute, and may be permissibly limited where a limitation addresses a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to (that is, effective to achieve) that objective, and a proportionate means of doing so. The committee considers that the bill clearly seeks to achieve the important and legitimate objective of enhancing online safety for Australian adults and children in a number of ways, including by providing for the speedy removal of intimate images posted without the subject's consent, or material which constitutes cyber-bullying of an Australian child, and cyber-abuse of an Australian adult. The committee considers that these measures in general appear to permissibly limit the right to freedom of expression.

2.42 However, the committee considers that there are some specific areas in which the proposed scheme could be amended to ensure that the Commissioner's proposed powers to remove or otherwise regulate access to specific forms of content is sufficiently circumscribed and appropriately targeted. These relate to material that depicts abhorrent violent conduct (Part 8), and 'online content' related to sex and nudity (Part 9). The committee considers that the proposed regulation of material depicting abhorrent violent conduct appears to be appropriately circumscribed, although it notes that some of the proposed safeguards could be further strengthened without compromising the intent of the scheme. As to Part 9, the committee considers that it has not been established that the proposed scheme for regulating online content—including sexual content—is sufficiently circumscribed such that it constitutes a permissible limitation on the right to freedom of expression.

Suggested action

2.43 With respect to material that depicts abhorrent violent conduct, the committee considers the proportionality of the proposed scheme may be assisted if the bill were amended as follows:

(a) amend subclauses 95(2) and 99(2) to provide that the list of steps that may be specified in a blocking request or notice are those set out in the legislation (and that those are not simply 'examples' of steps that may be taken);

(b) amend clauses 95 and 99 to establish a process by which the Commissioner may generally only issue a blocking notice after having issued a blocking request which has not been complied with, while retaining the power to immediately issue a blocking notice in urgent cases.

2.44 With respect to the proposed online content scheme, the committee considers the proportionality of the proposed scheme may be assisted if the bill were amended as follows:
(a) amend clauses 114 and 115 to provide that, in addition to a removal power, the Commissioner may issue to a social media, electronic or designated internet service a remedial notice requiring they take all reasonable steps to ensure that access to relevant material is subject to a restricted access system;

(b) amend clauses 119 and 120 to provide that, in determining whether to issue a remedial notice with respect to less serious class 2 content, the Commissioner must consider the purpose for which that content was published; whether it is in the public interest to require either the removal of, or the restriction of access to, that content; and the extent to which the interests of relevant parties and end-users would be affected; and

(c) amend subclause 108(4) to require the Commissioner, in making such a declaration, to have regard to: the extent to which a specific system may interfere with the end-users' right to privacy; the extent of any personal information which it may require users to provide; and the strength of any data protection mechanisms in place to protect personal information required to be provided.

2.45 The committee recommends that the statement of compatibility with human rights be updated to reflect the information which has been provided by the minister.

2.46 The committee draws these human rights concerns to the attention of the minister and the Parliament.

Disclosure of information about a complaint of cyber-bullying against children

2.47 The bill would establish a complaints mechanism for material which an ordinary person would conclude is likely intended to have the effect of seriously threatening, intimidating, harassing or humiliating an Australian child. Information gathered by the Commissioner in investigating this complaint can be disclosed to a number of specified bodies and persons, including to a teacher or school principal, or to a parent or guardian of an Australian child, if the Commissioner is satisfied the information will assist in the resolution of the complaint.

49 Part 1, clause 30.
50 Part 15, clauses 213 and 214.
Summary of initial assessment

Preliminary international human rights legal advice

Rights of the child

2.48 Enabling the Commissioner to share information about a complaint of cyber-bullying with teachers, principals, parents and guardians, engages the rights of the child. Australia is required to ensure that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child are a primary consideration.51 This requires legislative bodies to systematically consider how children’s rights and interests are or will be affected directly or indirectly by their decisions and actions.52 Children also have the right to privacy.53 States Parties are also required to assure to a child capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child.54 The views of the child must be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

2.49 It appears likely that these measures could have the effect of promoting the rights of the child, insofar as the disclosure may help to quickly resolve the cyberbullying complaint. However, if the personal information relating to the child's complaint is shared with teachers and principals, and parents and guardians (be it the parent or guardian of the complainant or the parent or guardian of the child accused of cyber-bullying), without the child's consent55 and against their wishes, this may limit the child's right to privacy, the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child and their right to express their views in matters that affect them. Most of the rights of the child may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

2.50 It is clear that the objective of the measure is to assist in resolving complaints of cyber-bullying, which would constitute a legitimate objective for the purposes of international human rights law. Disclosing information to teachers, principals, parents and guardians would appear to be rationally connected to this objective. In order to assess the compatibility of this measure with the rights of the child, further information is required as to:

51 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 3(1).
52 UN Committee on the Rights of Children, General Comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interest taken as primary consideration (2013).
55 It is noted that clause 215 provides a separate ground for disclosure of information that relates to the affairs of a person if that person has consented to the disclosure, which indicates that consent is not a requirement for disclosure to teachers, principals, parents and guardians under clauses 213 and 214.
(a) whether the requirement for the Commissioner to have regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the performance of their functions will require the Commissioner to consider the rights of the child as a primary consideration, and give due weight to the child's wishes in accordance with the age and maturity of the child, when considering whether to disclose information to teachers, principals, parents and guardians; and

(b) whether the rights of the child would be better protected if clauses 213 and 214 were amended to expressly provide that the Commissioner may disclose information to teachers, principals, parents and guardians where to do so would be in the best interests of the child complainant and, after first giving due weight to the child's wishes in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

Committee’s initial view

2.51 The committee considered that if the disclosure may help to quickly resolve the cyberbullying complaint, these powers could have the effect of promoting the rights of the child. However, the committee noted that if the personal information relating to the child’s complaint is shared against the child’s wishes this may limit the child’s right to privacy, the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child and their right to express their views in matters that affect them.

2.52 The committee considered further information was required to assess the human rights implications of this measure, and as such sought the minister’s advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [2.50].

2.53 The full initial analysis is set out in Report 3 of 2021.

Minister's response

2.54 The minister advised:

Disclosure of information and rights of the child

a) whether the requirement for the Commissioner to have regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the performance of their functions will require the Commissioner to consider the rights of the child as a primary consideration, and give due weight to the child’s wishes in accordance with the age and maturity of the child, when considering whether to disclose information to teachers, principals, parents and guardians;

Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) provides that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. Subclause 24 (1) of the Bill provides that the Commissioner must have regard to the CROC in the performance of their functions. The Bill supports the best interests of the child by providing mechanisms so that children are protected from cyber-bullying.
The CROC also recognises the right of a child not to be subjected to unlawful attacks on their honour and reputation. By providing remedies for a child who is the target of such material, the Bill advances these rights.

b) whether the rights of the child would be better protected if clauses 213 and 214 were amended to expressly provide that the Commissioner may disclose information to teachers, principals, parents and guardians where to do so would be in the best interests of the child complainant and, after first giving due weight to the child’s wishes in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

Under subclause 213(1), the Commissioner may disclose information to a teacher or school principal if satisfied that the information will assist in the resolution of a complaint about cyberbullying of a child made under clause 30 of the Bill. For example, where cyber-bullying involves a group of school students, enlisting the help of the school or schools attended by the students may be the quickest and most effective means of resolving the complaint. Subclause 213(2) allows the Commissioner to impose written conditions to be complied with in relation to information disclosed under subclause 213(1). For example, the Commissioner may impose a condition preventing secondary disclosures to third parties.

Similarly, subclause 214(1) enables the Commissioner to disclose information to a parent or guardian of an Australian child if the Commissioner is satisfied that the information will assist in the resolution of a complaint made under clause 30 of the Bill. Subclause 214(2) allows the Commissioner to impose written conditions to be complied with in relation to information disclosed under subclause 214(1). Such conditions may include a requirement preventing secondary disclosures to third parties.

Resolution of a complaint by teachers or principals, or parents or guardians, has advantages over the more formal regulatory channels available under the Bill. Disclosure under clauses 213 and 214 may help quickly resolve the cyber-bullying complaint and as such promote the rights of the child.

It would be expected that the Commissioner would consider the child’s views, consistent with the child’s age and maturity, in deciding whether or not to exercise the Commissioner’s discretion to disclose information under clauses 213 and 214. Part 15 of the Bill provides that the Commissioner may disclose information in certain circumstances. It should be noted that Part 15 does not require disclosure.

Concluding comments

International human rights legal advice

Rights of the child

2.55 The minister noted that article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. As to how this would apply to the Commissioner’s consideration of whether to disclose information to teachers, principals, parents and
guardians, the minister stated that subclauses 213(2) and 214(2) allow the Commissioner to prevent secondary disclosure to third parties. The minister stated that it is expected that the Commissioner would consider the child's views, consistent with the child's age and maturity, in deciding whether to exercise their discretion to disclose information.

2.56 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has provided clear guidance as to how the Convention on the Rights of the Child is to be interpreted, and the obligations which it establishes. Foremost, it has stated that the best interests of the child is not just one consideration among other equal considerations, rather it is a 'primary' consideration, as compared with other considerations.\(^{56}\) Further, the UN Committee has explained that when determining a child's best interests, the child's views must be taken into account, consistent with their evolving capacities and taking into account their characteristics (pursuant to article 12 of the Convention).\(^{57}\) It has explained that article 12 of the Convention has the effect that any decision that does not take into account the child’s views or does not give their views due weight according to their age and maturity, does not respect the possibility for the child or children to influence the determination of their best interests.\(^{58}\) The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has also emphasised that children have a right to privacy, which takes on increasing significance during adolescence.\(^{59}\)

2.57 As the bill provides that the Commissioner must, as appropriate, have regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and as the minister has stated that it is expected that the Commissioner would consider the child's views, consistent with the child's age and maturity, in deciding whether to exercise their discretion to disclose information, it may be that these disclosure powers would be exercised in a manner which is consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, this would appear to depend on the way the Commissioner exercised this discretion in practice. Having regard to the guidance provided by the UN Committee on the Rights

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56 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has explained that ‘the expression ‘primary consideration’ [in article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child] means that the child's best interests may not be considered on the same level as all other considerations. This strong position is justified by the special situation of the child’. See, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration* (2013); see also *IAM v Denmark*, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Communication No.3/2016 (2018) [11.8].

57 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration* (2013) [43]. See also, *General Comment No. 20 on the implementation of the rights of the child during adolescence* (2016) [22].

58 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration* (2013) [53].

59 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General Comment No. 20 on the implementation of the rights of the child during adolescence* (2016) [46].
of the Child as to the correct interpretation of the Convention, it would appear that in some decisions (particularly those relating to older children), the Commissioner would be required to consider the views of the child in determining what is in their best interests. As such, having a more explicit requirement that the Commissioner take into account the views of the child who made the complaint as to the disclosure of information to teachers, principals, parents or guardians, would strengthen the compliance of this measure with the rights of the child.

Committee view

2.58 The committee thanks the minister for this response. The committee notes that the bill would enable the Commissioner investigating a complaint of cyberbullying against a child to disclose information gathered in investigating that complaint to teachers, school principals, parents or guardians, if satisfied the information will assist in the resolution of the complaint.

2.59 The committee considers that if the disclosure may help to quickly resolve the cyberbullying complaint, these powers could have the effect of promoting the rights of the child. However, the committee notes that if the personal information relating to the child's complaint is shared against the child's wishes this may limit the child's right to privacy, the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child and their right to express their views in matters that affect them. In particular, the committee notes that an assessment of what is in the child's best interests may require the Commissioner to have regard to the child's own views, depending on their age and level of maturity.

Suggested action

2.60 The committee considers that the bill contains an important overarching safeguard in that it requires the Commissioner to, as appropriate, have regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in exercising their powers. The committee considers that this may be sufficient to adequately protect the rights of the child. However, the committee considers that this safeguard may be strengthened were clauses 213 and 214 amended to specifically clarify that, when considering whether to disclose information to teachers, school principals, parents or guardians relating to a complaint made by a child about cyber-bullying, the Commissioner must, depending on the age and maturity of an individual child, consider the child’s views as to the disclosure.

2.61 The committee also recommends that the statement of compatibility with human rights be updated to reflect the information provided by the minister.

2.62 The committee draws this matter to the attention of the minister and the Parliament.
Disclosure of information to authorities of foreign countries

2.63 The bill also provides that any information obtained by the Commissioner using these new powers\(^{60}\) can be disclosed to a number of listed authorities, including certain authorities of a foreign country where the Commissioner is satisfied that the information will enable or assist the foreign authority to perform or exercise their relevant functions or powers.\(^{61}\) The relevant authorities of the foreign countries are those that are responsible for regulating matters or enforcing laws of that country relating to the safe use of certain internet services and material that is accessible to the end-users of certain internet services. The Commissioner may impose conditions to be complied with when disclosing such information.\(^{62}\)

Summary of initial assessment

Preliminary international human rights legal advice

Rights to privacy and life, and prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

2.64 By authorising the disclosure of information obtained by the Commissioner, including personal information, to the authorities of foreign countries for the purpose of assisting them to perform or exercise any of their functions or powers, the measure engages and limits the right to privacy. The right to privacy includes respect for informational privacy, including the right to respect for private and confidential information, particularly the storing, use and sharing of such information.\(^{63}\) It also includes the right to control the dissemination of information about one's private life. The right to privacy may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

2.65 In addition, to the extent that the measure would authorise the disclosure of personal information to foreign authorities responsible for enforcing laws of the foreign country, where this may be used to investigate and convict a person of an offence to which the death penalty applies, the right to life may be engaged and limited. The right to life imposes an obligation on Australia to protect people from

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60 Part 15, clause 207.
61 Part 15, paragraphs 221(1)(h) and (i).
62 Part 15, subclause 212(2).
63 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 17. Every person should be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control their files and, if such files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed contrary to legal provisions, every person should be able to request rectification or elimination: UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (1988) [10]. See also, General Comment No. 34 (Freedom of opinion and expression) (2011) [18].
being killed by others or identified risks.\textsuperscript{64} While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not completely prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, international law prohibits states which have abolished the death penalty (such as Australia) from exposing a person to the death penalty in another state. This includes prohibiting the provision of information to other countries that may use that information to investigate and convict someone of an offence to which the death penalty applies.\textsuperscript{65} Additionally, it is not clear if sharing information with the authorities of certain foreign countries could risk exposing a person to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Australia has an obligation not to subject any person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\textsuperscript{66} Under international law the prohibition on torture is absolute and can never be subject to permissible limitations.\textsuperscript{67}

2.66 In order to assess the compatibility of this measure with human rights, further information is required as to:

(a) what is the nature and scope of personal information that is authorised to be disclosed to the authority of a foreign country;

(b) what conditions is it expected the Commissioner will impose on the disclosure of information with the authority of a foreign country and what are the consequences, if any, of that authority failing to comply with those conditions, particularly where an individual’s right to privacy is not protected;

(c) why there is no requirement in the bill requiring that the Commissioner, when disclosing information to a foreign country, must impose conditions in relation to privacy protections around the handling of

\textsuperscript{64} International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6. The right should not be understood in a restrictive manner: UN Human Rights Committee, \textit{General Comment No. 6: article 6 (right to life)} (1982) [5].

\textsuperscript{65} Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Committee stated its concern that Australia lacks ‘a comprehensive prohibition on the providing of international police assistance for the investigation of crimes that may lead to the imposition of the death penalty in another state’, and concluded that Australia should take steps to ensure it ‘does not provide assistance in the investigation of crimes that may result in the imposition of the death penalty in another State’: UN Human Rights Committee, \textit{Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Australia}, CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (2009) [20].

\textsuperscript{66} International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 7; and Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, articles 3–5. See also the prohibitions against torture under Australian domestic law, for example the \textit{Criminal Code Act 1995}, Schedule 1, Division 274.

\textsuperscript{67} Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 4(2); UN Human Rights Committee, \textit{General Comment 20: Article 7} (1992) [3].
personal information, and protection of personal information from unauthorised disclosure;

(d) what is the level of risk that the disclosure of personal information could result in: the investigation and conviction of a person for an offence to which the death penalty applies in a foreign country; and/or a person being exposed to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in a foreign country; and

(e) what, if any, safeguards are in place to ensure that information is not shared with the authority of a foreign country in circumstances that could expose a person to the death penalty or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including:

(i) the approval process for authorising disclosure;

(ii) the availability of any guidelines as to when disclosure would not be appropriate in certain cases and to certain countries; and

(iii) whether there will be a requirement to decline to disclose information where there is a risk that it may expose a person to the death penalty or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Committee’s initial view

2.67 The committee noted that authorising the disclosure of this information, which may include personal information, to the authorities of foreign countries engages and limits the right to privacy. The committee considered that enhancing the ability of foreign authorities to protect the interests of children and victims of cyber-abuse constitutes a legitimate objective, and authorising the sharing of information obtained by the Commissioner may be effective to achieve that important objective. However, the committee noted that some questions remain as to whether the measure is proportionate to achieving that objective.

2.68 The committee also noted that to the extent that the measure would authorise the disclosure of personal information to foreign authorities responsible for enforcing laws of the foreign country, where this may be used to investigate and convict a person of an offence to which the death penalty applies, the right to life may be engaged and limited. It was also not clear if sharing information with the authorities of certain foreign countries could risk exposing a person to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

2.69 The committee considered further information was required to assess the human rights implications of this measure, and as such sought the minister’s advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [2.66].

2.70 The full initial analysis is set out in Report 3 of 2021.
Minister's response

2.71 The minister advised:

Disclosure of information to the authority of a foreign country and human rights

a) what is the nature and scope of personal information that is authorised to be disclosed to the authority of a foreign country;

Part 15 of the Bill deals with the disclosure of information and provides that the Commissioner may disclose information in certain circumstances. Part 15 only applies to information that was obtained by the Commissioner as a result of the performance of a function, or the exercise of a power, conferred on the Commissioner by or under this Act. Consequently the Part does not provide for the disclosure of all information the Commissioner may receive or have access to.

Subclause 212(1) of the Bill authorises the Commissioner to disclose information to any of a variety of authorities listed in that clause, if satisfied that the information will enable or assist the authority to perform or exercise any of its functions or powers. This disclosure enables these authorities to function to its maximum extent to protect the best interests of affected children and victims of cyber-abuse or image-based abuse. The Commissioner would be expected not to disclose personal information about victims without their consent.

b) what conditions is it expected the Commissioner will impose on the disclosure of information with the authority of a foreign country and what are the consequences, if any, of that authority failing to comply with those conditions, particularly where an individual's right to privacy is not protected;

To ensure adequate protection of privacy, subclause 212(2) contains a provision which empowers the Commissioner, by writing, to impose conditions to be complied with in relation to information disclosed under this clause. This may include, for example, conditions that prevent further disclosure by the recipient to third parties.

c) why there is no requirement in the bill requiring that the Commissioner, when disclosing information to a foreign country, must impose conditions in relation to privacy protections around the handling of personal information, and protection of personal information from unauthorised disclosure;

The Commissioner may disclose information to designated foreign authorities only, who are responsible for regulating matters or enforcing laws relating to the safe use of certain internet services or material accessible to the end-users of certain internet services.

Paragraph 212(1)(h) and paragraph 212(1)(i) allows the Commissioner to disclose information to an authority of a foreign country that is responsible for regulating matters or enforcing laws of that country relating to either or
both the capacity of individuals to use social media services, relevant electronic services and designated internet services in a safe manner, or material that is accessible to, or delivered to, end-users of social media services, relevant electronic services and designated internet services. For example, the Commissioner may disclose information to the United States Department of Justice or the Commissioner’s counterpart (i.e. Online Safety Commissioner) in another country.

As stated in the previous response, to ensure adequate protection of privacy, subclause 212(2) empowers the Commissioner, by writing, to impose conditions to be complied with in relation to information disclosed under this clause.

d) what is the level of risk that the disclosure of personal information could result in: the investigation and conviction of a person for an offence to which the death penalty applies in a foreign country; and/or a person being exposed to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in a foreign country;

The disclosure of information is at the discretion of the Commissioner, limited only to regulators or law enforcement agencies dealing with online safety and can be subject to further conditions.

Subclause 212(1) of the Bill provides the Commissioner may disclose information to any of a variety of authorities listed in that clause, if satisfied that the information will enable or assist the authority to perform or exercise any of its functions or powers.

Paragraph 212(1)(h) and paragraph 212(1)(i) allows the Commissioner to disclose information to an authority of a foreign country that is responsible for regulating matters or enforcing laws of that country relating to either or both the capacity of individuals to use social media services, relevant electronic services and designated internet services in a safe manner, or material that is accessible to, or delivered to, end-users of social media services, relevant electronic services and designated internet services.

Subclause 212(2) allows the Commissioner to impose written conditions to be complied with in relation to information disclosed under subclause 212(1). This provides a safeguard by which the Commissioner may limit further disclosure of the information, where it is appropriate to do so.

e) what, if any, safeguards are in place to ensure that information is not shared with the authority of a foreign country in circumstances that could expose a person to the death penalty or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including:

(i) the approval process for authorising disclosure;

(ii) the availability of any guidelines as to when disclosure would not be appropriate in certain cases and to certain countries; and

(iii) whether there will be a requirement to decline to disclose information where there is a risk that it may expose a person to
the death penalty or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

By authorising the disclosure of information obtained by the Commissioner, to the authorities of foreign countries for the purpose of assisting them to perform or exercise any of their functions or powers, clause 212 engages and limits the right to privacy. However, the provision is necessary to allow the authorities to protect the best interests of affected children and victims of cyber-abuse and image-based abuse.

To ensure adequate protection of privacy, subclause 212(2) empowers the Commissioner to impose conditions to be complied with in relation to information disclosed under this clause, which may include, for example, conditions that prevent further disclosure to third parties.

Where information is provided to foreign law enforcement, it would be provided via Australian Federal Police and Interpol. Any information provided would therefore be consistent with the protocol of not disclosing law enforcement information to foreign agencies in circumstances where it might lead to prosecution involving the death penalty.

Concluding comments

International human rights legal advice

Rights to privacy and life, and prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

2.72 The minister noted that subclause 212(1) authorises the Commissioner to disclose information to a variety of authorities listed in that clause, if satisfied that the information will enable or assist the authority to perform or exercise any of its functions or powers. The minister indicated that such disclosure would enable those authorities to function to their maximum extent to protect the best interests of affected children and victims of cyber-abuse or image-based abuse, stating that the Commissioner would be 'expected' not to disclose personal information about victims without their consent. He further noted that paragraphs 212(1)(h) and (i) only enable the Commissioner to disclose information to certain types of authorities of foreign countries, that is, those who are responsible for regulating matters or enforcing laws relating to either or both the capacity of individuals to use social media services, relevant electronic services and designated internet services in a safe manner, or material that is accessible to end users. However, Part 15 of the bill does not restrict these information-sharing powers to investigations of child and other cyber-abuse. (It instead covers any information obtained by the Commissioner exercising their powers and functions.) Further, while the minister has stated that the Commissioner would be expected not to disclose personal information about a victim without their consent, there is no legislative requirement not to do so and it is not clear that they would not share personal information about other persons. Consequently, the scope of personal information that may be disclosed to the authority of a foreign country pursuant to Part 15 is not clear.
2.73 The minister further noted that subclause 212(2) empowers the Commissioner to impose conditions on the information disclosure, such as conditions to prevent further disclosure of the information to a third party. This has the capacity to serve as an important safeguard with respect to the right to privacy. However, no information has been provided as to whether and how such conditions would be enforced, and whether any consequences would flow from non-compliance with a condition, nor why the legislation does not itself require that such conditions be imposed.

2.74 Further information was sought as to the level of risk that the disclosure of personal information in this context could expose a person to the risk of the death penalty, or to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. However, no information was provided as to an assessment of such a level of risk. The minister stated that clause 212 does enable the Commissioner to impose conditions on the uses of information being disclosed in order to ensure adequate protection of the right to privacy, and advised that where information was being provided to foreign law enforcement, it would be provided via the Australian Federal Police and Interpol, meaning that any information provided would therefore be consistent with the protocol of not disclosing law enforcement information to foreign agencies in circumstances where it might lead to prosecution involving the death penalty. This may serve as an important safeguard (although noting that there have been instances of information being shared by Australian law enforcement agencies which have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty in the past). However, no information has been provided as to protocols against the sharing of information by a law enforcement agency in circumstances where it might expose a person to the risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and it is not clear what guidelines would operate with respect to the Commissioner. Further, there may be a risk that information being shared with foreign agencies other than law enforcement agencies could still expose an individual to a risk of harm, depending on the nature of the information and the jurisdiction in question.

2.75 Having regard to the range of information which would be liable to sharing by the Commissioner under this bill, and the many different foreign jurisdictions in which that information may be received and handled, it has not been established that the disclosure powers provided for in Part 15 would be accompanied by sufficient safeguards such that they would permissibly limit the right to privacy or adequately

68 For example, in 2005, the Australian Federal Police shared information with Indonesian authorities leading to the arrest of nine Australians in Indonesia, and subsequent convictions for attempting to smuggle drugs into the country. Two of those Australians were then executed. In 2009, the UN Committee on Civil and Political Rights noted concern as to Australia’s lack of a comprehensive prohibition on the provision of international police assistance for the investigation of crimes that may lead to the imposition of the death penalty in another state, in violation of the State party’s obligation under the Second Optional Protocol. See, Concluding Observations on Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5, 7 May 2009, [20].
protect persons from exposure to the risk of the death penalty, or torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Committee view

2.76 The committee thanks the minister for this response. The committee notes that the bill provides that any information obtained by the Commissioner using the powers under the bill can be disclosed to a number of listed authorities, including certain authorities of a foreign country where the Commissioner is satisfied that the information will enable or assist the foreign authority to perform or exercise certain regulatory or enforcement functions or powers.

2.77 The committee notes that authorising the disclosure of this information, which may include personal information, to the authorities of foreign countries engages and limits the right to privacy. The committee also notes that to the extent that the measure would authorise the disclosure of personal information to foreign authorities responsible for enforcing laws of the foreign country, where this may be used to investigate and convict a person of an offence to which the death penalty applies, the right to life may be engaged and limited.

2.78 The committee considers that it has not been clearly established that this proposed scheme is accompanied by sufficiently stringent safeguards such that it would ensure the adequate protection of personal information in all cases, or ensure that the sharing of information will not expose a person to the risk of the death penalty, or torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The committee considers that this is significant, noting the myriad foreign jurisdictions with which, and circumstances in which, information could be shared under Part 15 of the bill, and hence the risk that information-sharing may, in certain circumstances, lead to a person being harmed as a result.

Suggested action

2.79 The committee considers that the compatibility of the proposed information disclosure scheme may be strengthened were Part 15 of the bill amended to provide that:

(a) the Commissioner must not share information with any foreign entity where the Commissioner considers that there is an unacceptable risk that doing so may expose a person to the death penalty, or any risk of them being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

(b) the Commissioner must impose conditions in relation to privacy protections around the handling of personal information, and protection of personal information from unauthorised disclosure; and
(c) the Commissioner must develop guidelines setting out the consequences for a failure to comply with conditions attached to the disclosure of information, and a process by which to assess the risk of information sharing exposing a person to the death penalty, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in individual cases.

2.80 The committee further recommends that the statement of compatibility with human rights be updated to address the engagement of the right to life, and the absolute prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

2.81 The committee draws these human rights concerns to the attention of the minister and the Parliament.
Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Amendment Bill 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>This bill seeks to amend the <em>Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001</em> to establish the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust as an ongoing entity, and amend its operational powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio</td>
<td>Agriculture, Water and the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduced</td>
<td>House of Representatives, 18 March 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Freedom of expression; freedom of assembly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.82 The committee requested a response from the minister in relation to the bill in *Report 4 of 2021*.2

Prohibition on public assembly

2.83 This bill would establish the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust (the Trust) as an ongoing entity.3 It would also establish powers under the *Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001* (the Act) for the Trust to order that any person engaged in promoting, conducting or carrying out certain activity on Trust land must cease doing so, or must do (or not do) such things in relation to the activity as are specified in the order, and in the manner specified.4 The Trust could make such an order if the Trust reasonably believes that the activity contravenes a range of matters, including that the activity contravenes the regulations. A person would commit a strict liability offence if the person does not comply with the order, punishable by up to 10 penalty units (or $2,220).5

2.84 Section 11 of the current Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Regulations 2001 (the regulations) provides that it is an offence for a person to 'organise or participate in a public assembly on Trust land'.6 A 'public assembly' is defined in section 11(3) to include an organised assembly of persons for the purpose of holding a meeting, demonstration, procession or performance. The activity that would otherwise be an...
offence under section 11 is not an offence if it ‘is authorised by a licence or permit’ granted by the Trust.\(^7\)

**Summary of initial assessment**

**Preliminary international human rights legal advice**

**Rights to freedom of expression and assembly**

2.85 By providing for the enforcement of a prohibition against organising or participating in organised assemblies, this bill engages and appears to limit the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The right to freedom of expression extends to the communication of information or ideas through any medium, including public protest.\(^8\) The right to freedom of assembly protects the freedom of individuals and groups to meet and engage in peaceful protest and other forms of collective activity in public.\(^9\) These rights may be permissibly limited where a measure seeks to achieve a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to (that is, effective to achieve) that objective, and is a proportionate means by which to achieve it. In order for a measure to be directed towards a legitimate objective for the purposes of these two rights, a limitation must be demonstrated to be necessary to protect: the rights or reputations of others; national security; public order; or public health or morals.\(^10\) Further, in determining whether limitations on the freedom of expression are proportionate, the UN Human Rights Committee has previously noted that restrictions on the freedom of expression must not be overly broad.\(^11\)

2.86 Consequently, in order to assess the extent to which this bill engages and may limit the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, further information is required, and in particular:

(a) whether it is intended that section 11 of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Regulations 2001 will be retained as drafted, retained subject to amendments, or removed;

(b) how the organisation of, or participation in, a public assembly (including a meeting, demonstration, procession, performance, or sporting event) on Trust land would constitute a threat to public order or public health;

(c) what safeguards exist to protect the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, noting that the regulations establish a broadly defined

\(^7\) Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Regulations 2001 [F2010C0026], subsection 23(d).

\(^8\) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 19.

\(^9\) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 21.


\(^11\) UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No.34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression* (2011) [34]-[35].
prohibition on a public assembly which would appear to include assemblies which may pose no threat to public order on public lands (including how often has the Trust issued or refused to issue a permit for the carrying out of assemblies, and on what basis); and

(d) why other, less rights restrictive alternatives (such as only prohibiting activities contravening regulations which constitute a public hazard or a risk to public health) would not be effective to achieve the objective of this measure.

Committee’s initial view

2.87 The committee noted that this measure appeared to constitute a prohibition on public assemblies in these areas, unless the Trust otherwise grants a permit to allow an assembly to take place. The committee noted that this engages and appears to limit the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The committee noted that these rights may be permissibly limited where a limitation is reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

2.88 The committee noted that the Attorney-General previously advised the committee that the regulations are being considered as part of a broader independent review of the work of the Trust, and that consideration of whether the approach taken with respect to public assemblies remains appropriate would be undertaken during that review, and with respect to the development of replacement regulations.\(^\text{12}\) However, the committee noted that the explanatory memorandum accompanying this bill states that the regulations are anticipated to be 'remade with minor changes to their operation',\(^\text{13}\) and that the *Independent Review of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust 2020* does not appear to discuss proposed amendments to the regulations relating to these matters.\(^\text{14}\) As such, the committee considered that it was not clear whether it is intended that this aspect of the regulations will be retained. The committee noted that this is the chief consideration in its assessment of the extent to which this bill engages and may limit the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, and as such sought the minister’s advice as to the matters set out at paragraph [2.86].

2.89 The full initial analysis is set out in *Report 4 of 2021*.


\(^{13}\) Explanatory memorandum, p. 13.

Minister’s response\textsuperscript{15}

2.90 The minister advised:

The Government is in the process of remaking the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Regulations 2001 (the Regulations), which are due to sunset on 1 October 2021.

In doing this, the intention is to redraft regulation 11 to ensure it is consistent with Australia’s international human rights obligations.

When the Harbour Trust was first formed, the sites were un-remediated and closed to the public with many public health hazards. The regulations drafted in 2001 were, at the time, considered necessary for protecting the public from threats posed by un-remediated sites.

With most of the Trust’s sites now remediated and open to the public, it is intended that regulation 11 will now be amended to be more explicitly compatible with the right of peaceful assembly contained in Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Concluding comments

International human rights legal advice

Rights to freedom of expression and assembly

2.91 The rights to freedom of expression and assembly appeared to be engaged by this bill, as the bill would establish powers for the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust to make an order against any person engaged in promoting, conducting or carrying out certain activity on Trust land, including where the activity contravenes the regulations.\textsuperscript{16} Section 11 of the current regulations provides that it is an offence for a person to ‘organise or participate in a public assembly on Trust land’,\textsuperscript{17} which includes an organised assembly of persons for the purpose of holding a meeting, demonstration, procession or performance.\textsuperscript{18}

2.92 The minister advised that the government is in the process of remaking these regulations, which are due to sunset on 1 October 2021, and intends to re-draft regulation 11 to ensure it is consistent with Australia’s international human rights obligations, and in particular, be more explicitly compatible with the right of peaceful assembly.

\textsuperscript{15} The minister’s response to the committee’s inquiries was received on 14 April 2021. This is an extract of the response. The response is available in full on the committee’s website at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights/Scrutiny_reports.

\textsuperscript{16} Schedule 1, Part 3, item 13, proposed subsection 65B(1).

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Trust land’ is defined in section 3 and listed in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Act. It includes a number of Lots in Middle Head, Georges Heights, Woolwich, and Cockatoo Island.

\textsuperscript{18} Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Regulations 2001 [F2010C0026], subsection 23(d).
assembly. Consequently, if such amendments are made and the regulations are made compatible with these rights, it appears that the bill would not engage the rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

Committee view

2.93 The committee thanks the minister for this response. The committee notes that the bill seeks to establish the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust as an ongoing entity, and empower it to enforce compliance with a range of matters related to Trust lands, including matters provided for under the regulations, which currently make it an offence for a person to organise or participate in a public assembly on Trust land.

2.94 The committee welcomes the minister’s advice that the government is in the process of remaking the current regulations to ensure they are consistent with Australia's international human rights obligations, and are more explicitly compatible with the right of peaceful assembly. As such, if such amendments are made to the regulations, the committee considers that the bill does not engage the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The committee will assess any future regulations once they are registered.

Suggested action

2.95 The committee recommends that consideration be given to updating the explanatory memorandum and statement of compatibility with human rights to reflect the information which has been provided by the minister.

Dr Anne Webster MP

Chair